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ABSTRACT
This paper contains the first estimates of the price sensitivity of the prevalence of youth
marijuana use.  Survey data on marijuana use by high school seniors from the Monitoring the Future
Project are combined with data on marijuana prices and potency from the Drug Enforcement
Administration Office of Intelligence or Intelligence Division.  Our estimates of the price elasticity
of annual marijuana participation range from –0.06 to –0.47, while those for thirty day participation
range from –0.002 to –0.69.  These estimates clearly imply that changes in the real, quality adjusted
price of marijuana contributed significantly to the trends in youth marijuana use between 1982 and
1998, particularly during the contraction in use from 1982 to 1992.  Similarly, changes in youth
perceptions of the harms associated with regular marijuana use had a substantial impact on both the
contraction in use during the 1982 though 1992 period and the subsequent expansion in use after
1992. These findings underscore the usefulness of considering price in addition to more traditional
determinants in any analysis of marijuana consumption decisions made by youths.
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A recent report sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism suggests that illicit drug use in America costs society 
approximately $110 billion each year (NIDA 1998).  Adults alone do not generate these costs.  
Statistics from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse show that current use of illicit 
drugs among youths (12-17 years of age) doubled from a historic low in 1992 of 5.3% to 11.4% 
in 1997 before falling to 9.9% in 1998 (SAMHSA 1999). Data from the Monitoring the Future 
study yielded even higher estimates of use, and a similar sharp increase in that period (Johnston 
et al. 1999).  Even more disturbing, however is the finding that of an estimated 4.1 million 
people who met diagnostic criteria (DSM-IV) for dependence on illicit drugs in 1998, 1.1 million 
(26.8%) are youths between the ages of 12-17 (SAMHSA 1999).   
Marijuana is by far the most commonly used illicit substance among adolescents and has 
been so for the past twenty-five years.
1  Figure 1 shows historical data on annual alcohol, 
marijuana, and other illicit drug use from the Monitoring the Future Survey of High School 
Seniors, one of the main national studies used to track youth substance use and abuse.  The 
prevalence of marijuana has consistently been about half that of alcohol, far greater than the 
overall proportion using any of the other illicit drugs (Johnston et al. 1999).  When the other 
illicit drugs are broken up by type of substance (Figure 2), it is easy to see that no other single 
substance has even been half as prevalent as marijuana during the 1975-1998 period.   
The sheer popularity of marijuana among youths makes it an interesting illicit substance 
to examine.  However, there are other factors that motivate a closer examination of the demand 
for marijuana by youths.  First, early marijuana use has been associated with a wide range of 
anti-social and dangerous behaviors, including driving under the influence, dropping out of 
school, engaging in crime, and destruction of property (Brook et al. 1999; SAMHSA 1998a 2 
1998b; Yamada, Kendix, and Yamada 1996; Spunt et al. 1994; Osgood et al. 1988).  Second, 
there is increasing evidence that marijuana is an addictive substance and that regular use can 
result in dependency (DeFonseca et al. 1997; SAMHSA 1998b). Third, regular marijuana use has 
been associated with a number of health problems, particularly among youth, including upper 
respiratory problems (Polen et al. 1993; Tashkin et al. 1990) and reproductive system problems 
(Nahas and Latour, 1992; Tommasello, 1982).  Finally, it is widely believed that marijuana is a 
gateway substance, or that early involvement with marijuana can increase the likelihood of later 
use of “harder drugs”.  Although there is no clear evidence of a causal link between early 
marijuana use and subsequent illicit drug use, there is significant evidence of a strong correlation 
and that early marijuana use is an antecedent (Kandel 1975; Kandel, Kessler, and Margulies 
1978; Ellickson, Hays and Bell 1992; Brook et al. 1999; Ellickson and Morton in press). 
  In this chapter we explore the demand for marijuana among a nationally representative 
sample of American High School Seniors from the Monitoring the Future Survey.   Our main 
contribution is to present the first set of estimates of the price sensitivity of the prevalence of 
youth marijuana use.  A related contribution is to assess the extent to which trends in price 
predict the reduction in marijuana participation in the 1980s and early 1990s and the increase in 
participation since 1992.  In Section I we discuss in greater detail the magnitude of the problem, 
presenting summary statistics of the prevalence of marijuana use and how it has changed over 
time.  We also discuss what is currently known about the short and long run implications of 
regular and heavy marijuana use.  In Section II we provide a brief summary of the literature on 
the contemporaneous and intertemporal demand for marijuana. In Section III we present findings 
from new time-series analysis of the demand for marijuana by youths using data from the 1982-
1998 Monitoring the Future Survey of High School Seniors.  The purpose of this section is to 3 
identify factors that are significantly correlated with the trend in marijuana use over time.  In 
Section IV we re-examine the importance of these factors in repeated cross-sectional analyses of 
the 1985-1996 Monitoring the Future Survey.    
 
I.  Youth Marijuana Use: The Scope of the Problem 
As is indicated in Figure 2, marijuana is the most popular illicit substance among youths 
and has been for at least the past 25 years.  Its use, however, has fluctuated quite a bit.  Figure 3 
shows lifetime, annual and thirty-day prevalence of marijuana use among high school seniors in 
the Monitoring the Future Study from 1975 to 1998.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
marijuana use was at its peak.  In 1978, 37.1% of American High School Seniors reported using 
marijuana in the previous thirty days.  Annual prevalence of marijuana use was 50.2% and 
lifetime prevalence was 59.2%.   Annual and lifetime prevalence continued to climb over the 
next year, although thirty-day prevalence started to decline.  From 1981-1992, marijuana use 
among high school seniors was declining across all measures of use.  By 1992, youth marijuana 
use was at an all-time record low, with 11.9% of high school seniors reporting use of marijuana 
in the previous thirty days, 21.9% reporting use in the past year, and 32.6% reporting use in their 
lifetime.  After 1992 the trend changed and marijuana use again began to rise.  By 1997, thirty-
day prevalence rates were back up to 23.7% and annual and lifetime prevalence rates were 
38.5% and 49.6%, respectively.   The 1998 data from the MTF survey suggest that the upward 
trend may be leveling off.  In that year, 22.8% of high school seniors reported use of marijuana 
in the past thirty days, while 37.5% reported using in the past year and 49.1% reported using in 
their lifetime.  
Although current prevalence estimates are still well below their peak in the late 1970s, 4 
the recent upward trend in marijuana use among youths is disturbing for a number of reasons.  
First, the increase can be seen across both genders and all ethnic groups, suggesting that this is 
not a trend being driven by a small subgroup of the youth population (Johnston et al. 1999; 
SAMHSA 1996).  Second, the average age of first marijuana use has been declining during this 
period, with an average age of initiation of 17.7 in 1992 and an average age of 16.4 in 1996 
(ONDCP 1999).   
Finally, we may not yet really understand all of the factors that led to the recent increase 
in marijuana use or, for that matter, the decline that occurred during the 1980s.  Some factors, 
such as perceived harm, disapproval and availability of marijuana, have been shown to be 
significantly correlated with marijuana use over time (Bachman, Johnston and O’Malley 1998; 
Caulkins 1999; Johnston et al. 1999) Johnston and his colleagues (Johnston et al. 1999; Johnston 
1991) have offered several explanations for why perceived harm, in particular, may have 
changed in the ways that it did. These include: increased media attention to the consequences of 
marijuana use beginning in the late 1970s; the large number of heavy users found in most 
schools by the late 1970s, affording peers the opportunity to directly observe the consequences 
of their drug use; and the active containment efforts by many sectors of society during the 1980s 
that included the anti-drug advertising campaigns of the mid-to-late 1980s.  Similarly, for the 
upturn in the 1990s, Johnston and his colleagues hypothesize that several of the factors that may 
have contributed to the decline in the 1980s were reversed, including: reduced attention from the 
national media beginning with the buildup to the Gulf War in 1991 and continuing afterwards; 
reduced rates of use among peers providing fewer opportunities for vicarious learning in the 
immediate social environment; sizable cuts in federal funding for drug prevention programs in 
schools in the early 1990s; and the substantial decline in the media placement of the national 5 
anti-drug advertising campaign of the Partnership for a Drug Free America.  In addition, they 
point to the increased glamorization of drug use in the lyrics, performances, and off-stage 
behavior of many rock, grunge, and rap groups as a factor likely to have contributed to the rise in 
youth drug use in the 1990s. 
To the extent that there is some degree of covariation among the various substances in 
their intertemporal trends (see Figure 4), there may be some common determinants of their use.  
This covariation was perhaps most apparent during the 1990s, when nearly all forms of licit and 
illicit drug use rose to some degree among high school seniors.  However, there are enough 
differences among their cross-time usage profiles to conclude that there are also unique factors 
influencing their use (Johnston et al. 1999).  Price, for example, is a logical candidate. 
Unlike alcohol, cigarettes or cocaine, where the harmful consequences of youth use have 
been clearly established, there is tremendous uncertainty regarding the short- and long-term 
consequences of youth marijuana use.  This uncertainty has led some to question why we should 
even be concerned that marijuana use is on the rise.  Most regular or heavy marijuana users also 
use alcohol or other substances regularly, so that it is difficult to identify a causal link between 
particular negative consequences and regular marijuana use.  Nonetheless, two reports 
commissioned by the National Institute on Drug Abuse in the United States and the National 
Task Force on Cannabis in Australia review the existing scientific literature and identify several 
psychological and health effects that can be generally attributed to regular and/or chronic 
marijuana use and that can lead to negative outcomes, particularly among youth (NIDA 1995; 
Hall et al. 1994).  These areas include (1) diminished cognitive functioning, (2) diminished 
psychomotor performance, (3) increased health services utilization, and (4) the development of 
dependence.  In addition, both reviews cite the significant correlation between early marijuana 6 
use and subsequent harder drug use as a further reason to be concerned about use of marijuana 
among youths.  
 
I.A.  Diminished Cognitive Functioning 
  One of the major reasons for widespread recreational use of marijuana is that it produces 
a high associated with mild euphoria, relaxation and perceptual alterations.  Cognitive changes 
also occur during the high, including impaired short-term memory and a loosening of 
associations, which makes it possible for the user to become lost in pleasant reverie and fantasy.  
Recent studies have identified that this diminished cognitive functioning can be attributed to the 
presence of cannabinoid receptor sites in the areas of the brain that control memory (Matsuda, 
Bonner and Lolait 1993; Heyser, Hampson, and Deadwyler 1993).  Activation of these receptors 
interrupts normal brain motor and cognitive function, thus affecting attention, concentration and 
short-term memory during the period of intoxication.   
It is this negative impact on concentration, attention and short-term memory that have led 
many to conclude that marijuana use diminishes human capital formation for youths.  Indeed, 
research shows that there is a significant contemporaneous correlation between marijuana use 
and poor grades and dropping out of school (Bachman et al. 1998; Mensch and Kandel 1988; 
Yamada, Kendix, and Yamada 1996). However, findings from longitudinal studies suggest that 
these negative associations disappear when other factors, such as lower educational aspirations, 
academic performance, and problem behavior, are controlled for (Ellickson et al. 1998; 
Newcombe and Bentler 1988; Kandel et al. 1986).  One longitudinal study found the negative 
association to persist after controls were included for motivational factors, but it persisted for 
only one population subgroup: Latinos (Ellickson et al. 1998).  Marijuana use remained 7 
insignificant for the general sample of young adults and for the other ethnic subgroups.   
There are several shortcomings in these studies that make the interpretation of their 
findings suspect.  In particular, early use of alcohol, cigarettes and marijuana are consistently 
treated as exogenous variables.   Only one study to date explicitly tests this assumption, but it 
does so using a different measure of marijuana use than that typically examined by other studies.  
In a longitudinal analysis of the relationship between marijuana initiation and dropping out of 
high school, Bray et al. (2000) examine the impact of initiating marijuana use by age 16, 17 and 
18 on the likelihood of dropping out of school.  They find that marijuana initiation is positively 
related to dropping out of high school, although the magnitude and significance of the 
relationship varies with the age of dropout and with the other substances used. They test the 
possible endogeneity of marijuana initiation and find that they cannot reject exogeneity.  
However, because their measures does not distinguish new experimenters from regular or long-
time users, their finding of exogeneity should not be generalized.  
 
I.B.  Diminished Psychomotor Performance 
  It is clear that marijuana use impairs judgment and motor skills by distorting perceptions 
of space and time.  The extent of the impairment, of course, is largely determined by the inhaled 
or ingested dose, as in the case of alcohol.  The question then becomes to what extent the 
impaired performance translates into accidental injury to the user or those around him/her.   
Much of the research in this area has focused on automobile accidents and fatalities. 
Epidemiological studies that try to identify an association between THC level and crashes and/or 
fatalities are problematic for two reasons.  First, the vast majority of accident-involved 
individuals test positive for alcohol use as well.  One recent review of the epidemiology literature 8 
showed that although 4% to 12% of drivers who sustained injury or death in crashes tested 
positive for THC, at least 50%, and in some cases 90%, of the drivers also tested positive for 
alcohol impairment (Robbe and O’Hanlon 1999).
2  There have been relatively few studies that 
contain large enough samples of non-alcohol impaired drivers to examine this issue.  One study 
of drivers arrested for reckless driving who were not alcohol impaired did find that half of these 
individuals tested positive for marijuana (Brookoff et al. 1994).  A second problem with these 
studies, however, is that a positive test for marijuana does not necessarily mean that the 
individual was under the influence at the time of the accident. THC stays in the blood stream 
much longer than other intoxicants, so a positive test may simply indicate recent use.   
Experimental studies that use driving simulators and closed-course driving environments 
try to overcome these problems. In a review of this literature, Smiley (1986) concludes that 
although drivers under the influence of marijuana are more likely to make errors, such as 
departing from their lane, they also drive slower than sober drivers and keep a greater distance 
from the car in front of them.  Intoxicated alcohol drivers, on the other hand, are more likely to 
increase their speed, which perhaps explains the comparatively smaller number of marijuana-
related accidents on the road.   
The preceding conclusion continues to be supported in more recent studies (e.g. Robbe 
and O’Hanlon 1993) and is consistent with findings from a recent econometric study using 
reduced form equations to examine the relationship between alcohol and marijuana use and the 
probability of non-fatal and fatal accidents among youths (Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1997).  
Using self-reported information on non-fatal accidents in the Monitoring the Future Survey, 
Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1997) find that a reduction in marijuana prices, which they show 
reduces youth drinking and presumably increases youth marijuana use, leads to a significant drop 9 
in the probability of a non-fatal motor vehicle accident.   They interpret this net negative effect as 
evidence that the substitution towards marijuana generates an increase in the probability of a 
non-fatal accident that is smaller than the decrease associated with the decline in drinking and 
driving.  They draw a similar conclusion when examining the effects of marijuana 
decriminalization on the probability of a fatal motor vehicle accident among youths using data 
from the Fatal Accident Reporting System.  So although there is significant evidence suggesting 
that marijuana intoxication leads to an increased risk of motor vehicle accidents, the risk is not 
believed to be anywhere near as large as the risk associated with drinking and driving. 
 
I.C.  Increased Health Services Utilization 
There is increasing, albeit controversial, evidence that regular marijuana use is associated 
with upper respiratory problems, such as chronic bronchitis, inflamed sinuses, and frequent chest 
colds (Nahas and Latour 1992; Tashkin et al. 1990), and reproductive system problems, such as 
reduced sperm production and delay of puberty (Nahas and Latour 1992; Tommasello 1982).  A 
significant problem in identifying the health effects associated with marijuana use is that the vast 
majority of marijuana users also use other substances, particularly alcohol and cigarettes.  It is 
difficult, therefore, to identify whether particular substances generate specific health outcomes or 
if it is the combination of substances. Two approaches have been generally used to try to tease 
out the relationship.  The first approach relies on individual level data where there is a high 
incidence of marijuana users who do not use other substances.  For example, Polen et al. (1993) 
were able to identify 452 Kaiser Permanente enrollees that were daily marijuana smokers who 
never smoked tobacco.  They compared the health service utilization among these daily 
marijuana-only smokers to non-smokers with similar demographics screened at Kaiser 10 
Permanente Medical centers between July 1979 and December 1985.   They examined medical 
care utilization for a number of health-specific outcomes over a one to two year follow up and 
found that marijuana smokers have a 19% increased risk of outpatient visits for respiratory 
illnesses, a 32% increased risk of injury, a 9% increased risk of other illnesses and were 50% 
more likely to be admitted to the hospital than nonsmokers.  These results were adjusted for sex, 
age, race, education, marital status, and alcohol consumption. 
  The second approach to understanding the relationship between marijuana use and health 
has focused on examining the correlation between general consumption rates and health care 
utilization.  For example, Model (1993) examined the effect of marijuana decriminalization 
status on the incidence of marijuana-related hospital emergency room episodes using data from 
the 1975-1978 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).  During the mid-1970s several states 
chose to decriminalize possession of small amounts of marijuana, thus reducing the penalties 
associated with using it.  Model (1993) found that states that had chosen to decriminalize 
experienced significantly higher rates of marijuana-related emergency room episodes.   
  Although both approaches clearly establish a positive association between marijuana use 
and health service utilization, they have yet to demonstrate a direct link between marijuana use 
and particular health outcomes or illnesses. 
 
I.D.  Development of Dependence 
Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, the general consensus opinion regarding marijuana 
was that it was not a drug of dependence because marijuana users did not exhibit tolerance and 
withdrawal symptoms analogous to those seen in alcohol and opiate dependence.  In the late 
1970’s, however, expert opinion regarding marijuana dependence began to change as a new, 11 
more liberal definition of drug dependence, embodied in Edwards and Gross’s (1976) alcohol 
dependence syndrome, was extended to all psychoactive drugs (Edwards et al. 1981).  This new 
definition reduced the emphasis on tolerance and withdrawal and attached greater emphasis on 
the continued use of the drug in the face of its adverse effects.  It is this new conception of 
dependence that is reflected in the Third Revised and Fourth Editions of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III-R and DSM-IV).  A 
diagnosis of psychoactive substance dependence is made if any three of nine criteria are present 
for a month or longer.  It is therefore not necessary that a person exhibit physical dependence on 
a drug for them to be diagnosed as dependent (Hall et al. 1994). 
Studies employing these new criteria for marijuana dependence have determined that 
marijuana dependence syndrome occurs much more frequently than previously believed. 
According to data from the 1993 National Comorbidity Study, nine percent of those who 
reported trying marijuana reported dependence at some stage (Anthony, Warner, and Kessler 
1994).   Data from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area study found that half of those classified as 
having experienced drug dependence in their lifetime reported only using marijuana, suggesting 
that marijuana users constitute a substantial fraction of all those dependent on illicit drugs 
(Anthony and Helzer 1991).   
Although tolerance and withdrawal symptoms are not required within the DSM-III-R and 
DSM-IV, there is evidence that both can occur for chronic heavy cannabis users (Jones and 
Benowitz 1976; Georgotas and Zeidenberg 1979; Weller and Halikas 1982).  There is also 
clinical and epidemiological evidence that some heavy marijuana users experience problems 
controlling their use despite the experience of adverse personal consequences (Stephens and 
Roffman 1993; Kandel and Davie 1992; Jones 1984).  However, many researchers note that the 12 
physical withdrawal symptoms for those suffering from a physical dependence on marijuana are 
minor and typically pass within a few days if they are experienced at all (Jones 1987; Jones 
1992; Compton, Dewey, and Martin 1990).   
Given that the predominant social pattern for marijuana use is recreational and/or 
intermittent use of relatively low doses of THC, the actual risk of developing a dependence 
syndrome is relatively small for most individuals using marijuana.  Further, assuming that the 
physical withdrawal symptoms are truly minor, marijuana dependence would be fairly easy to 
treat.  However, the addictive nature of marijuana is clearly underestimated by most individuals 
who decide to use the drug.   
 
I.E.  Marijuana as a Gateway Drug 
The importance of marijuana as a gateway drug remains highly controversial, despite 
tremendous evidence of a correlation between early marijuana use and later hard drug use.  The 
finding that marijuana use precedes harder drug use and that this sequencing persists across 
youth of different gender, race or ethnicity is well established (Kandel 1975; Kandel, Kessler, 
and Margulies 1978; Ellickson, Hays, and Bel, 1992; Kandel et al. 1992; Ellickson and Morton 
in press).  However, the proper interpretation of this consistent finding remains debatable.  
Temporal precedence and statistical correlation are only necessary conditions for establishing 
causality, not sufficient conditions.  It might very well be the case that this consistent finding in 
the literature is the result of a spurious correlation driven by other individual factors or problem 
behaviors, such as truancy, poor grades, delinquency, and others.   Debate ensues regarding the 
plausibility of alternative proposed causal mechanisms.  These mechanisms can be grouped into 
two general categories:  physiological and sociological factors.   13 
The physiological arguments are based on findings from two recent papers in Science 
(June 27, 1997) that demonstrate that cannabis activates neurochemical processes in rats that 
respond in a qualitatively similar way to cocaine, heroin, tobacco and alcohol (DeFonseca et al. 
1997; Tanda, Pontieri, and DiChiara 1997).  These findings support the argument that favorable 
experimentation with and regular consumption of marijuana will make youths more receptive to 
experimenting with other types of intoxicants, particularly those that offer similar psychological 
effects.  However, neither study actually examined the relationship between rats’ cannabis 
consumption and their consumption of harder drugs or their motivation to use these drugs, so 
their findings cannot be interpreted as definitive proof of causality.   
Sociological arguments generally tend to focus on the information that is learned when 
experimenting with marijuana (Kaplan 1970; MacCoun, Reuter, and Schelling 1996).  For 
example, it may be the case that seemingly safe experiences with marijuana might reduce the 
adolescent’s perceptions regarding the perceived harmfulness, both in terms of legal risks and 
health risks, of using harder drugs.  Alternatively, exposure to the marijuana market place may 
bring casual marijuana users into contact with hard drug sellers, again influencing their 
perceptions regarding the legal risks of using illicit drugs.  It was this latter argument that 
persuaded the Dutch to separate the soft and hard drug markets by permitting low-level cannabis 
sales in coffee shops and nightclubs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995).   
Despite the numerous theories that propose specific causal mechanisms for this observed 
sequencing, very little empirical work has been done trying to verify the existence of a causal 
mechanism. At least one published study reports a structural relationship between prior 
marijuana use and current demand for cocaine, although it does not attempt to identify the causal 
mechanism (DeSimone 1998).  Using data from the 1988 NLSY, DeSimone (1998) estimates the 14 
current demand for cocaine as a function of past marijuana use (use reported in the 1984 survey) 
and current values of other correlates of cocaine demand using a sample of individuals who had 
not previously used cocaine. A two-stage instrumental variable approach is used to account for 
the potential correlation between past marijuana use and the current period error term.  
Instruments for the past use of marijuana included two measures of state-level penalties for 
marijuana possession, the beer tax, and an indicator of parental alcoholism or problem drinking.  
Estimates from this model suggest that prior use of marijuana increases the probability of using 
cocaine by more than 29%, even after one controls for unobserved individual characteristics, 
providing the strongest evidence that the observed sequencing in use is not being driven by a 
spurious correlation between demand equations. 
As the above demonstrates, regular and/or heavy marijuana use is associated with a 
number of negative short- and long-term consequences, including reduced educational 
attainment, increased risk of accidents, increased use of health care services, increased risk of 
dependence and a possible increased risk in the use of harder substances.  The problem is that the 
literature exploring a causal link between marijuana and these potential consequences is still 
relatively sparse and much remains to be explored.   
 
II.  The Demand for Marijuana by Youths: Key Insights from the Literature 
  Few economic studies analyzing the determinants of marijuana demand were done prior 
to the 1990s because of the limited information available on the price of marijuana.  Nonetheless, 
a significant literature developed due to the work of epidemiologists and other social scientists 
who were interested in exploring other correlates and causes of marijuana use. Most of these 
studies examine how individual and environmental characteristics, lifestyle factors (grades, 15 
truancy, religious commitment, evenings out for recreation), and proximate factors (perceptions 
and attitudes about marijuana) correlate with current use of marijuana among adolescents.    
  It is not surprising that a key finding from this literature is that the same general 
background and lifestyle factors that are significantly correlated with early use of alcohol and 
other drugs are also correlated with marijuana use.  Although gender and ethnicity are 
consistently significantly correlated with marijuana use, with men being significantly more likely 
to use marijuana than women ,and blacks being much less likely to use marijuana than whites, 
they are not viewed as leading determinants of marijuana use.  Instead, truancy, frequent 
evenings away from home for recreation, low religiosity, and low perceived harmfulness or 
disapproval (Bachman et al. 1988; Bachman, Johnston, and O’Malley 1981; Jessor, Chase and 
Donovan 1980) are considered to be the most significant correlates of marijuana use.   Part-time 
employment and income are considered to be more moderate correlates, with youths reporting 
working more hours per week and higher incomes being more likely to use marijuana (Bachman 
et al. 1988; Bachman, Johnston, and O’Malley 1981).   Social factors, such as use by peers or 
family members and reduced familial attachment, are also significantly correlated with marijuana 
use (Brook, Cohen, and Jaeger 1998; Kandel 1985; Jessor, Chase, and Donovan 1980).  
  Nisbet and Vakil (1972) contributed the first economic study to this literature.  They used 
a self-administered survey of 926 UCLA students in an effort to obtain information on the price 
of marijuana in addition to the quantity of marijuana consumed.   Students were asked how many 
ounces of marijuana they purchased at current prices as well as how much they would buy if 
faced with alternative hypothetical price changes.  Two alternative functional forms of very basic 
demand curves were estimated that included only measures of the quantity of marijuana 
consumed in a month, the price per ounce, mean monthly total expenditures and an expenditure 16 
dispersion measure.  Price was found to be a significant determinant of quantity consumed.  
Estimates of the price elasticity of demand ranged from –0.40 to –1.51 when information on 
hypothetical prices was included.  When the data were restricted to just actual purchase data, the 
price elasticity of demand fell into a narrower range of –1.01 and –1.51. 
The Nisbet and Vakil (1972) study provides us with the only published price elasticity of 
demand for marijuana.  However, the findings from this study are not generalizable because they 
are based on a very small convenience sample of college students, do not account for other 
important demand factors, and employ data that are almost thirty years old.  In addition, the 
estimated price elasticities are likely to be overstated in absolute value because students who 
consume relatively large amounts of marijuana have incentives to search for lower prices.
3   
More recent studies by economists and other social science researchers that use nationally 
representative samples and include other demand factors lack information on the money price of 
marijuana.  Most try to overcome this data shortcoming by focusing on other aspects of the full 
price of this substance.  For example, several studies use cross-state variation in marijuana 
decriminalization status to examine the impact of lower legal sanctions on the demand for 
marijuana.  The findings with respect to the impact of decriminalization on the use of marijuana 
by youths and young adults are generally mixed.   Early studies focusing on youth populations 
generally found that decriminalization had no significant impact on demand.  For example, 
Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman (1981) compared change in marijuana use in decriminalized 
states to that in non-decriminalized states using data from the Monitoring the Future Survey of 
High School Seniors and found no significant difference.    
DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) came to a similar conclusion using state-level aggregated 
data from the 1980-1989 Monitoring the Future Survey.  They estimated log-linear and bivariate 17 
probit models of the likelihood of using alcohol and marijuana.   In addition to including 
marijuana decriminalization status, they included a regional price of alcohol and the minimum 
legal purchase age for beer in all specifications.  They found that the marijuana decriminalization 
variable had no significant effect on marijuana use.  Thies and Register (1993) similarly found 
no significant impact of marijuana decriminalization on the demand for marijuana among a 
sample of young adults from the 1984 and 1988 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  
They estimated logit and tobit specifications of the demand for marijuana, binge drinking, and 
cocaine and included cross-price effects in all of the regressions.  Pacula (1998a) also found no 
significant effect of marijuana decriminalization in her two-part model specification of the 
demand for marijuana using data from the 1984 NLSY.   
Two recent studies using youth samples from the MTF study and including information 
on the median fines imposed for possession of marijuana have found a positive effect of 
decriminalization on marijuana use.  Chaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras (1999) used data from 
the 1982 and 1989 MTF to estimate annual and thirty-day prevalence of marijuana and cocaine 
use among high school seniors.  Their models included measures of the median fines for 
possession of marijuana and showed that individuals living in decriminalized states were 
significantly more likely to report use of marijuana in the past year.  They found no significant 
impact on thirty-day prevalence, however.  In a separate study examining the relationship 




th grade surveys to estimate a two-part model of the current demand 
for cigarettes and marijuana.  They found that marijuana decriminalization had a positive and 
significant effect on both the prevalence and quantity consumed of marijuana when median jail 
terms and fines were also included in the model. 18 
  Studies employing data on the overall population have generated more consistent 
findings with respect to the effects of marijuana decriminalization on the consumption of 
marijuana.  For example, Model (1993) analyzed the effect of marijuana decriminalization on 
drug mentions in hospital emergency room episodes using data from the 1975-1978 Drug Abuse 
Warning Network (DAWN).  Although she did not directly estimate demand functions for 
marijuana, results from multiple variants of her model consistently showed that cities in states 
that had decriminalized marijuana experienced higher marijuana ER mentions and lower other 
drug mentions than non-decriminalized cities.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) estimated individual 
level prevalence equations for past year and past month use of marijuana, alcohol, cocaine, and 
heroin using data from the 1988, 1990, and 1991 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse.   
They found that marijuana decriminalization had a positive and significant effect on marijuana 
prevalence, supporting the conclusion made by Model that individuals in the general population 
are responsive to changes in the legal treatment of illicit drugs.    
Studies examining other components of the legal risk of using marijuana, such as fines 
for possession and marijuana arrest rates, have generated similarly mixed findings in terms of 
youth responsiveness.  For example, Chaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras (1999) and Chaloupka et 
al. (1999) both found using different samples from the MTF that youths were responsive to 
median fines for possession of marijuana.  However, using individual level data from the 1990-
1996 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse to estimate state-fixed effects models of the 
prevalence of marijuana and cigarette use, Farrelly et al. (1999) found that higher median fines 
for possession of marijuana had no significant effect on youths between the ages of 12 and 20.  
They did find a statistically significant effect on young adults between the ages of 21 to 30.  
They further found that young adults, but not youths, were responsive to marijuana arrest rates.  19 
Individuals living in areas where marijuana arrests were a higher fraction of total arrests were 
significantly less likely to use marijuana.   
Pacula (1998b) provided further evidence that young adults are sensitive to general 
enforcement risk using data from the 1983 and 1984 NLSY.  In her models of the intertemporal 
demand for alcohol and marijuana, she used a measure of common crime to the number of police 
officers at the MSA level as an indicator of the enforcement risk of using marijuana.  She found 
that higher crime per officer ratios were associated with increased use of marijuana for young 
adults.   
   Unlike the economic literature on the demand for other intoxicating substances, where 
the focus of the research has been on estimating the own-price elasticity of demand, much of the 
economic literature on the demand for marijuana has focused on analyzing cross-price effects 
because of the unavailability of marijuana price data.  The goal of this research has been to 
determine whether marijuana is an economic substitute or complement to other substances that 
are believed to have more harmful consequences associated with use.  The findings with respect 
to the relationship between marijuana and cigarettes have been consistent so far.  Higher 
cigarette prices lead to lower cigarette and marijuana use among youths and young adults 
(Chaloupka et al. 1999; Farrelly et al. 1999).    
  Findings are mixed, however, when it comes to other substances.  Initial research on the 
relationship between the demands for alcohol and marijuana suggested that these two goods were 
economic substitutes for youths.  DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) found that higher minimum legal 
purchase ages reduced alcohol consumption and increased marijuana consumption over time 
using aggregated data from the MTF.  They further found that individuals living in 
decriminalized states were significantly less likely to use alcohol, which they interpreted as 20 
evidence of a substitution effect even though decriminalization did not statistically influence 
marijuana consumption.  Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1997) similarly found evidence of a 
substitution effect between alcohol and marijuana using individual level data from the 1982 and 
1989 MTF.  They estimated ordered and dichotomous probits of drinking frequency and found 
that marijuana decriminalization had a consistent negative effect.  They further found in 
restricted models that incorporated information on marijuana prices, that higher marijuana prices 
were generally associated with increased likelihood of drinking and drinking heavily.  
  Subsequent research that analyzes individual-level demand equations for marijuana has 
raised some doubt of a substitution effect.  Pacula (1998a and 1998b) finds in both her 
contemporaneous and intertemporal demand models using the 1984 NLSY that higher beer 
prices are associated with reduced levels of drinking and marijuana use.  She interprets this as 
evidence of a complementary relationship between alcohol and marijuana.  Farrelly et al. (1999) 
similarly find that higher beer taxes reduce the probability of currently using marijuana among 
their sample of 12-20 year olds from the 1990-1996 NHSDA.  However, they also find that 
higher beer taxes have no significant effect on the demand for marijuana among their young 
adult sample (ages 21-30).  The finding of no significant effect among older populations is 
consistent with what was found by Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) when they estimated annual and 
thirty-day prevalence of marijuana use using the 1988, 1990, and 1991 NHSDA.  
  Although Model’s (1993) research examining ER episodes suggests that marijuana is an 
economic substitute for other illicit substances in general, studies that actually estimate 
individual level demand equations generate mixed findings with respect to cross-price effects for 
specific substances.  Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) find that higher cocaine prices are associated 
with reduced marijuana participation in the past month and the past year while marijuana 21 
decriminalization is generally associated with increased cocaine consumption, suggesting that 
these two goods are economic complements.  The findings regarding marijuana and heroin, 
however, are more mixed.  Higher heroin prices are found to generally reduce marijuana 
participation, although the findings are sensitive to other prices included in the model.  
Marijuana decriminalization, on the other hand, has no significant impact on heroin participation. 
  Of course a major concern in trying to interpret the findings from all of these studies is 
the fact that all but one (Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1997) exclude a measure for the monetary 
price of marijuana.  Thus it is difficult to know whether the estimates from these models are 
biased and, if so, in what direction. 
   Most of the research just reviewed focuses on determinants of the contemporaneous 
demand for marijuana.  Research examining changes in the trend of marijuana use over time 
suggests that significant predictors of contemporaneous demand cannot account for the change 
we have seen in demand over time (Bachman, Johnston, and O’Malley 1998; Bachman et al. 
1988).  Using data from the 1976-1986 MTF survey of high school seniors, Bachman et al. 
examine through multivariate analysis the influence of lifestyle factors (grades, truancy, hours 
worked/week, weekly income, religious commitment, political conservatism, and evenings out 
per week), attitudes (perceived harmfulness and disapproval of regular marijuana use) and 
secular trends (mean marijuana use among seniors for that year) on variation in individual use of 
marijuana over time.  They find that attitudinal measures are by far the most powerful predictors 
of change.  When attitudinal measures are included in the regression, the influence of the secular 
trend becomes insignificant, suggesting that the secular trend can be entirely explained by 
measures of perceived risk or disapproval.   Similarly, the influence of lifestyle factors as a group 
diminishes with the inclusion of the attitudinal variables, although some factors such as truancy 22 
and evenings out continue to have large effects.  The fact that lifestyle factors alone could not 
diminish the influence of the secular trend on individual marijuana use suggests that attitudes and 
not lifestyle factors are more important in determining trends in marijuana use over time.   
  In a follow up study that expanded the previous research by examining a longer time 
period and replicated the analysis on 8
th and 10
th graders, Bachman, Johnston and O’Malley 
(1998) reaffirm their previous findings.  Using data from 1976-1996, they again find evidence 
that the influence of lifestyle variables on marijuana use occurs primarily through disapproval 
and perceived risk.   Further, they also find that the secular trends in marijuana use can be 
completely explained by changes in attitudes over time.   
  In light of these findings and the fact that self-reported perceived availability did not 
change significantly during the periods being examined, Bachman, Johnston, and O’Malley  
(1998) concluded that supply reduction has limited potential to influence use over time and the 
focus of government efforts should be on trying to influence perceived harm and disapproval.  
Caulkins (1999) challenged this conclusion by arguing that the MTF indicator of availability 
may not be properly calibrated to detect significant changes in perceived availability.  He 
showed that there is indeed a strong negative correlation between median national marijuana 
prices and seniors’ self-reported use between 1981 and 1997.  Depending on the measure of use, 
Caulkins found a correlation coefficient between –0.79 and –0.95, which overlaps with the 
simple correlation coefficients obtained between participation and perceived harm.  Although 
this is not definitive evidence that supply factors substantially influence marijuana use by youths 
over time, Caulkins argued that it suggests that further analyses exploring the relative importance 
of supply factors over time is needed.  We conduct such analyses in the remainder of this paper.   
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III.  Time-Series Analysis 
  In this section we focus on national trends in marijuana participation in the past year 
(annual participation) and in the past thirty days (thirty-day participation) by MTF high school 
seniors for the period from 1982 through 1998.  We relate these trends to trends in the real price 
of marijuana, the purity of marijuana as measured by its delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
potency, and the perceived risk of great harm from regular marijuana use as reported by the MTF 
seniors.
4  Included are multiple regressions of past year or past month participation on the three 
variables just mentioned and a time trend.  We begin with data for 1982 because that is the first 
year in which potency and prices are available. 
  Compared to the repeated cross-sectional analysis that follows, the national analysis has 
certain advantages.  First, it covers a longer period of time.  Second, it puts purity on equal 
footing with other determinants since this variable only is available at the national level.  Third, 
we can examine whether changes in price and the perceived harm from regular marijuana use 
have the potential to account for a significant share of the observed changes in youth marijuana 
use over time.   
The disadvantages of the time series are that there are a small number of observations and 
a considerable amount of intercorrelation among the variables.    In addition, this analysis is 
limited by the lack of data on marijuana prices prior to 1982, particularly when comparing the 
contributions of price and perceived harm in predicting the downward trend in marijuana use in 
the 1980s.  Starting in 1982 misses the early part of the downturn in use that began in 1979 and 
the 25-percentage point increase in the proportion of youth seeing great risk from regular 
marijuana use that occurred between 1978 and 1982.  Any conclusions reached from these 
analyses must be interpreted with caution. 24 
 
III.A.  Monitoring the Future Prevalence Data 
The Monitoring the Future (MTF) Survey is a nationally representative, annual school-
based survey of approximately 16,000 high school seniors in approximately 130 public and 
private high schools each year.  One of the main purposes of the study is to explore changes in 
youths’ perceptions, attitudes, and use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs.  As such, great care 
is taken to ensure that responses pertaining to use of each of these substances are valid and 
reliable.   Students complete self-administered, machine-readable questionnaires in their normal 
classroom, so parents are not present when the students are filling out the questionnaires nor are 
they informed of the students’ responses. The survey was developed and is conducted by the 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan.  Detailed information 
pertaining to survey design and sampling methods is available in Johnston et al. (1999).  Further 
information regarding the validity of these data is available in Johnston and O’Malley (1985). 
The University of Michigan team reports aggregate measures of use from the survey annually 
(Johnston et al., 1999, is the most recent in their annual monograph series). 
 
III.B.  Data on Marijuana Prices and Potency 
  There are two sources of data on marijuana prices: the System to Retrieve Information 
from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) and the Illegal Drug Price/Purity Report (IDPPR).  The Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the U.S. Department of Justice maintains both.  DEA and 
FBI agents and state and local police narcotics officers purchase illicit drugs on a regular basis in 
order to apprehend dealers.  Taubman (1991) argues that DEA agents must make transactions at 
close to the street prices of the drugs in order to make an arrest because an atypical price can 25 
cause suspicion on the part of dealers.   
  Information on the date and city of the purchase, its total cost, total weight in grams, and 
purity (as a percentage) for certain drugs is recorded in STRIDE for each of approximately 140 
cities. Most of the data pertain to cocaine or heroin since DEA agents have focused their efforts 
on apprehending cocaine and heroin dealers since STRIDE was created in 1977.  Cocaine 
purchases are the most numerous: approximately 30,000 in the period from 1981 through 1998, 
compared to only 3,000 for marijuana.  No information on the purity of marijuana is recorded.  
In addition no distinction is made between wholesale and retail purchases, although the latter 
involve smaller quantities than the former.    
  Given the small number of marijuana purchases and given that almost 30 percent are 
made in the District of Columbia, STRIDE cannot be used to develop marijuana prices at the 
state or local level.  Moreover, this database cannot be used to adjust price for purity and to 
distinguish between retail and wholesale purchases.  Therefore, in the repeated cross-sectional 
analysis in the next section and in the trend analysis in this section, prices are taken from the 
following publications of the DEA Office of Intelligence or Intelligence Division: The Domestic 
Cities Report (1982 through third quarter of 1985); the Illicit Drug Wholesale/Retail Price 
Report (fourth quarter of 1985 through fourth quarter of 1990); and the Illegal Drug Price/Purity 
Report (first quarter of 1991 through last quarter of 1998).  The publications just mentioned 
contain data for nineteen cities in sixteen states.  In general the prices are reported quarterly.  In 
1982, 1983, and 1984, a single city-specific figure is given for each of the four marijuana price 
series (see below for more details), and the quarter for which the figure pertains is not given.
5  
Data for the first and third quarters of 1985, the second quarter of 1988, and the second quarter 
of 1996 are missing.  The cities are as follows: Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; 26 
Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; Houston, Texas; Los 
Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Newark, New Jersey; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, 
New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; San Diego, California; San Francisco, 
California; Seattle, Washington; St. Louis, Missouri; and the District of Columbia. 
  Four marijuana price series are contained in these publications: the wholesale price (price 
per pound) of commercial grade marijuana, the wholesale price of a more potent grade called 
sinsemilla, and the retail price (price per ounce) of each of these two grades.  In most cases the 
price range (minimum and maximum price) is reported.  In some cases a single price is quoted.  
The number of observations on which the price range or price is based is not reported. 
  For convenience, we refer to prices from the sources just described as IDPPR or 
nineteen-cities prices from now on.  The purchases on which these prices are based are sent to a 
laboratory at the University of Mississippi, which distinguishes between commercial marijuana 
and sinsimella and ascertains the THC content of each purchase as a percentage.  Annual average 
percentages for commercial marijuana and sinsemilla potency are published, but figures for the 
individual cities are not given.
6  No distinction is made between potency at the wholesale and 
retail levels.  In our sample period the mean potency of commercial marijuana was 4.09 percent 
and the mean potency of sinsemilla was 8.39 percent, with the simple pairwise correlation 
coefficient between the two equal to 0.43.        
  We obtain four annual price series from IDPPR by taking the midpoint of each price 
range (defined as the simple average of the maximum and minimum price), converting all prices 
into prices per gram, and converting to real prices by dividing by the annual Consumer Price 
Index for the U.S. as a whole (1982-84 = 1).  The four prices are highly correlated.  The pairwise 
simple correlation coefficients between them range from 0.73 in the case of the retail commercial 27 
price and the retail sinsemilla price to 0.92 in the case of the wholesale and retail sinsemilla 
prices.  In the trend and regression analyses in this section we employ the retail commercial price 
and the potency of commercial marijuana.  The retail price is clearly the most relevant one for 
youth consumption decisions.  There are no data, however, to indicate whether commercial 
marijuana or sinsemilla is more commonly consumed by young marijuana users. Given the 
evidence that commercial marijuana dominates the US marijuana market for the period covered 
by these analyses (Kleiman 1992; National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee 1998), 
we suspect that commercial marijuana is likely to be the type most used by high school seniors.
7  
  For the period as a whole, the average nominal price of retail commercial marijuana was 
$5.97 per gram, and the average nominal price of wholesale commercial marijuana was $3.15 
per gram.  The corresponding prices for sinsemilla were $10.41 per gram at the retail level and 
$6.71 per gram at the wholesale level.  Since a marijuana cigarette (a “joint”) typically contains 
0.5 grams (Rhodes, Hyatt, and Scheiman 1994), one retail commercial joint costs approximately 
$3.00 in nominal terms in our sample period.  For comparative purposes, a six-pack (six 12 
ounce cans) of beer costs approximately $3.50.  If one assumes that a joint produces the same 
“high” as two or three cans of beer, the purchase of marijuana puts at least as great a dent in a 
youth’s budget as the purchase of beer.         
 
III.C.  Trends 
  Trends in annual marijuana participation as a percentage, thirty-day marijuana 
participation as a percentage, and the percentage reporting great risk of harm from regular 
marijuana use (termed harm from now on) are shown in Figure 5.  These data reveal a cycle in 
use in the period at issue: a contraction from 1982 through 1992 followed by an expansion from 28 
1992 through 1998.  Annual prevalence fell from 44.3 percent in 1982 to 21.9 percent in 1992 
and then rose to 37.5 percent in 1998.  Thirty-day prevalence followed a similar pattern.  It 
declined from 28.5 percent in 1982 to 11.9 percent in 1992 and then grew to 22.8 percent in 
1998.    
  The trend in the harm measure leads the trends in the two participation series.  It grew 
from 60.4 percent in 1982 to 76.5 percent in 1992 and then shrank to 58.5 percent in 1998.  This 
suggests the trend in harm has the potential to help explain the differential trend in the number of 
users in the two subperiods of 1982-1992 and 1992-1998.  This is particularly true because the 
peak in harm (78.6 percent in 1991) leads the trough in annual or thirty-day participation by one 
year.  
  The real price of commercial retail marijuana and the potency of commercial marijuana 
are plotted in Figure 6.  These two series are more erratic than the three in Figure 5.  Their 
behavior during the two subperiods, however, has the potential to help explain the cycle in 
participation. From 1982 to 1992, price more than tripled while potency fell by 22 percent.  
Since 1992, real price fell by 16 percent, and potency increased by 53 percent.   Moreover, the 
peak in the real price of one gram of marijuana ($7.64 in 1991) leads the trough in participation 
by one year.   
  Between 1982 and 1998, the number of high school seniors using marijuana in the past 
year declined by 15 percent and the number using marijuana in the past thirty-days declined by 
20 percent.  At the same time, price almost tripled, potency increased by approximately 20 
percent, and the number reporting harm from regular marijuana use fell by 3 percent.  If we 
compare only the two end points (1982 and 1998), the price rise is consistent with the decline in 
the prevalence of marijuana use, but the increase in potency and the decline in perceived risk are 29 
not.  In our view, however, it is misleading to focus on the end points given the considerable 
change within the interval. Given this change, it is much more meaningful to separately examine 
the 1982-1992 contraction and the 1992-1998 expansion.  
  In theory, price and potency should be positively correlated.  The simple correlation 
between these two variables is 0.35 for the entire period, but they are negatively correlated in 
each of the two subperiods. This is likely to reflect the considerable measurement error in these 
data, particularly in the potency data (Kleiman 1992).  
  Limited information is available to explain trends in price and potency.  Presumably, 
price varies over time due, in part, to variations in resources allocated to apprehension and 
conviction of dealers and to crop reduction.  Pacula (1998a) documents that the first factor 
explains differences in the price of marijuana among cities in 1987, and Grossman and 
Chaloupka (1998) report a similar finding in the case of cocaine prices in 1991.  Crane, Rivoli, 
and Comfort (1997) show that increases in interdiction lead to increases in the real price of 
cocaine in a time series for the years 1985 through 1996.  Kleiman (1989) presents evidence 
suggesting a positive correlation between resources allocated to enforcing marijuana laws and 
the real price of marijuana in the 1980s.   
  The Drug Enforcement Administration (1999) hypothesizes that the increase in potency 
over this time period can at least be partially attributed to the implementation of its Domestic 
Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program in 1979.  It began as an aggressive eradication 
effort in just two states, Hawaii and California.  By 1982, the program had grown to include 
eradication efforts in 25 states.  By 1985, all 50 states were receiving funding for similar 
eradication programs.  Although the program targets both outdoor and indoor cultivation, indoor 
cultivation is more difficult to detect.  One of the main outcomes of this program, therefore, has 30 
been the abandonment of large outdoor plots for indoor cultivating areas that are safer and easier 
to conceal.  This movement indoors has led to the more widespread use of hydroponic 
cultivation, a cultivation method employing a nutrient solution instead of soil that enables 
growers to produce a more potent form of marijuana. 
 
 III.D.  Conceptual Issues 
  Three conceptual issues need to be addressed in specifying time-series demand functions 
for marijuana participation.  The first pertains to the appropriateness of including the harm 
measure in these demand functions.  High school seniors’ perceptions about the perceived risk of 
great harm from regular marijuana use are not formed in a vacuum.
8  Instead, these perceptions 
are likely to depend on attitudes and behaviors of parents, older siblings, and peers.  If this is the 
case, then harm is an endogenous variable that may be correlated with the disturbance term in the 
structural demand function for marijuana participation that includes it.  One factor is that harm 
may be correlated with an unmeasured characteristic, such as “a thrill-seeking personality,” that 
causes both marijuana participation and perceptions of risk.  A second factor is that there may be 
true reverse causality from participation to risk.  A youth who smokes marijuana may be less 
likely to report that it is a harmful behavior than a youth who does not smoke marijuana.   
  We term the first factor “statistical endogeneity” arising from a recursive model with 
correlated errors and the second factor “structural endogeneity.”  Both factors cause the 
coefficient of harm in the demand function to be biased and inconsistent.  In addition the price 
coefficient is biased if it is correlated with harm.  A relationship between price and harm in 
which a reduction in the real price leads to a reduction in perceived harm is quite plausible.  For 
example, suppose that a reduction in price encourages participation or consumption given 31 
participation by older peers.  This should lower high school seniors’ perception of harm and 
increase their participation.
9 
  In principle, one could employ simultaneous equations methods, such as two-stage least 
squares, to obtain consistent estimates of the structural demand function.  However, we lack an 
instrument for harm.  Since harm is endogenous, one wants to allow for both a direct effect of 
price on participation with harm held constant and for an indirect effect that operates through 
harm.  In this section we estimate demand functions with and without the harm variable by 
ordinary least squares.  We also estimate equations that include harm but exclude price and 
potency.  This allows us to examine the importance of price as a determinant of youth marijuana 
participation and to determine how the price coefficients change when harm is included or 
excluded from the models. 
  A second conceptual issue pertains to biases in the price coefficient due to measurement 
error and the endogeneity of this variable.  It is plausible that price is subject to measurement 
error because only its midpoint is available.  Moreover, we do not know the quantity employed 
to calculate the retail price of a one-gram purchase of marijuana.  A distinguishing characteristic 
of the market for illegal drugs is that the average cost of a purchase falls as the size of the 
purchase increases (DiNardo 1993; Caulkins 1994; Rhodes, Hyatt, and Scheiman 1994; 
Grossman and Chaloupka 1998).  If youths typically purchase 1 or 2 grams (2 or 4 joints) at a 
time and the retail price is estimated from a larger purchase, we underestimate the price actually 
paid by youths.  Trends in the purchase size on which the IDPPR price is calculated or trends in 
the purchase size made by youths create biases due to measurement error.  If the error due to 
these factors or to the absence of mean or median prices is random, the price coefficient is biased 
towards zero. 32 
  We assume that the supply function of marijuana is infinitely elastic and that price varies 
over time due to variations in resources allocated to apprehension and conviction of dealers and 
to crop reduction.  Even if the supply function is not infinitely elastic, high school seniors can be 
viewed as price takers if they represent a small fraction of marijuana users.  If this is not the case 
and the supply function slopes upward, we understate the price coefficient or elasticity in the 
demand function in absolute value.  If the supply function slopes downward due to externalities 
(the greater is market consumption, the smaller is the probability of catching a given dealer), the 
price coefficient or elasticity in the demand function is overstated.  On balance, we believe that 
biases due to measurement error are the most important and that the price coefficients or 
elasticities that we report are conservative lower-bound estimates. 
  The final conceptual issue deals with the incorporation of purity or potency into the 
demand function.  Here it is natural to view purity as an index of quality and to appeal to the 
literature on the demand for the quantity and quality of a good (Houthakker 1952-53; Theil 
1952-53; Rosen 1974).  The simplest model in this literature is one in which consumers demand 
quality-adjusted quantity and base consumption decisions on quality-adjusted price.  In our 
context quality-adjusted quantity is given by Q = mq, where m is the number of marijuana 
cigarettes smoked and q is quality or potency as measured by THC content.  Quality-adjusted 
price is given by p* = p/q, where p is the price of a joint.  This model suggests a conditional 
demand function for m by marijuana users whose arguments are p and q.  With p held constant, 
an increase in q lowers, raises, or has no impact on m as the price elasticity of demand for m is 
less than, greater than, or equal to 1 in absolute value.
10  The model also suggests a demand 
function for participation in which this decision is a negative function of p*.  Hence, 
participation is more likely the smaller is p and the larger is q.
11 33 
 
III.E.  Results 
  Definitions, means and standard deviations of the variables in the time-series regressions 
are shown in Table 1.  Tables 2 and 3 contain demand functions for annual and thirty-day 
marijuana participation, respectively.  The t-ratios of all regression coefficients in these tables 
are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors that allow for heteroscedasticity and for 
autocorrelation up to and including a lag of three.  Standard errors based on longer lags were 
very similar to those contained in the tables.  The first regression in Panel A of either table 
includes the real retail price of commercial marijuana and the potency of commercial marijuana.  
The second regression adds a linear time trend, and the third adds the square of time.  
Regressions (4)-(6) delete price and potency from regressions (1)-(3) and add the percentage of 
high school seniors reporting great risk of harm from regular marijuana use.  Panel B of either 
table employs price, potency and harm in the same models. 
  According to the first three models in Panel A of Table 2, price always has a negative 
effect on annual participation that is significant at conventional levels.  As expected the 
regression coefficient of potency is positive and significant except in the model that includes a 
quadratic time trend.  Evaluated at the sample means, the price elasticity of annual marijuana 
participation ranges between -0.27 and -0.41.  In the two models in which the potency coefficient 
is positive, its elasticity equals 0.49.  This is somewhat larger than the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of 0.41 in model 1 or 0.40 in model 2, but the price and potency elasticities do not 
differ dramatically.  This gives some support for the notion that participation depends on quality-
adjusted price. 
  The regression coefficient of harm is negative and significant in the last three models in 34 
Panel A of Table 2.  A 10-percentage point increase in the harm measure lowers annual 
participation by between 6 and 7 percentage points. 
  When harm is entered together with price and potency in the models in Panel B of Table 
2, the price coefficient retains its negative sign and is significant at the 5 percent level on a one-
tailed test.  The price elasticities are reduced by between 23 and 50 percent and now range from  
-0.20 to -0.31.  The potency effects are positive but not significant when harm is held constant.  
The two positive potency coefficients in Panel A are much larger than the corresponding 
coefficients in Panel B.  Harm retains its significance when price and potency are held constant, 
but the magnitude of the effect is reduced by between 12 and 24 percent.  
  The results in Table 3 tell a similar story to those in Table 2.  The price elasticity of 
thirty-day participation is somewhat larger than the price elasticity of annual participation except 
in models that include a quadratic time trend or harm and time.  But the observed differences are 
not substantial.  The largest occurs when the only other regressor is potency: -0.48 for the price 
elasticity of thirty-day participation compared to -0.41 for the elasticity of annual participation.   
  One way to evaluate the nine models in each table is to see how well they predict the 
reduction in marijuana participation between 1982 and 1992 and the increase between 1992 and 
1998.  Table 4 contains estimates of the predicted changes in annual and thirty-day marijuana 
prevalence based on the estimates contained in Tables 2 and 3.   The component labeled price is 
obtained by multiplying the change in price between the initial and terminal years by the 
regression coefficient of price.  The potency and harm components have similar interpretations.  
In general, the predicted changes in participation associated with the changes in perceived risk 
are relatively stable across specifications, while those associated with price and potency are more 
sensitive to the choice of specification.   35 
  Between 1982 and 1992, annual participation declined by 22.4 percentage points. Based 
on the estimates from the specifications that include price, potency and harm, the changes in 
price during this period suggest a 6.9 to 10.4 percentage point reduction in annual participation, 
while those in potency imply a reduction of 0.3 to 0.9 percentage points.  Similarly, the changes 
in harm during this period suggest a 7.8 to 9.1 percentage point reduction in annual prevalence.  
Because an increase in price unadjusted for potency or a reduction in potency raises quality-
adjusted price, the price and potency components can be summed to form a single, quality-
adjusted price component.  In the most complete specifications that control for time trends 
(linearly or quadratically), the quality-adjusted price changes predict a 7.5 to 7.8 percentage 
point reduction in prevalence, while the changes in harm predict a 7.8 to 9.1 percentage point 
reduction.  
  Similarly, in the 1982 through 1992 period, monthly participation declined by 16.6 
percentage points.  Based on the estimates from specifications that include price, potency, and 
harm, with or without controlling for time trends, the changes in price during this period predict 
a 2.8 to 6.8 percentage point reduction in monthly participation, while the changes in potency 
suggest relatively little change.  The changes in harm predict a 7.3 to 8.2 percentage point 
reduction in monthly prevalence.  In the specifications that include a linear or quadratic time 
trend, the changes in quality-adjusted price predict a 3.1 to 3.2 percentage point reduction in 
participation, while those in harm predict a 7.6 to 8.2 percent reduction. 
  Between 1992 and 1998, annual participation rose by 15.6 percentage points, while 
monthly participation rose by 10.9 percentage points.  Focusing on comparable models to those 
discussed for the earlier period, the changes in the quality-adjusted price during this period 
predict an increase of between 2.4 and 3.1 percentage points in annual participation and an 36 
increase of between 0.9 and 1.3 percentage points in monthly participation.  Similarly, the 
changes in harm predict increases of 8.7 to 10.2 percentage points in annual participation and 8.2 
to 9.2 percentage points in monthly participation.   
  To summarize, the changes in quality-adjusted price and perceived risk predict much of 
the contraction in youth marijuana use in the 1982 to 1992 period and the expansion in use after 
1992.  Both factors appear roughly equally important in accounting for the reduction in annual 
participation in the earlier period, with perceived risk somewhat more important in accounting 
for the reduction in monthly participation during this period.  Changes in harm, however, appear 
to play a much stronger role than changes in quality-adjusted price during the more recent 
expansion in youth marijuana use. 
 
IV.  Repeated Cross-Section Analysis of Marijuana Demand 
  To investigate individual demand for marijuana among youth, we use micro-level data 
from the 1985-1996 MTF.  These data allow us to incorporate more determinants than those 
employed in the time-series analysis.  At the same time, we base estimates of the price elasticity 
of demand for marijuana on prices that vary among cities as well as over time in the context of a 
fixed-effects estimation strategy.  By employing a set of dichotomous indicators for states of the 
United States in all models, we hold constant unmeasured variables that may be correlated with 
consumption and price.  Finally, we include measures of cigarette and beer prices to investigate 
whether marijuana, cigarettes, and beer are substitutes or complements for youths.  We examine 




IV.A.  Measurement of Variables and Empirical Implementation 
  Table 5 contains definitions, means, and standard deviations of all variables.  MTF 
survey respondents report the number of occasions in the past year and in the past thirty days on 
which they used marijuana (grass, pot) or hashish (hash, hash oil).  These are ordered categorical 
variables with seven outcomes: 0 occasions, 1-2 occasions, 3-5 occasions, 6-9 occasions, 10-19 
occasions, 20-39 occasions, and 40 or more occasions.  Participants are youths who reported a 
positive number of occasions.
 13  
  Demographic characteristics included in this analysis are: gender (male or female), race 
(white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other), age, parental education (less than 
a high school education, at least a high school education), total number of siblings, family 
structure (live alone, live with mother, live with father, both parents present, or other living 
arrangement), mother’s work status while growing up (full-time, part-time, or stay at home), and 
place of residence (rural, suburb, city).  Lifestyle factors include marital status (married or 
engaged versus being single), attendance at religious services (no attendance, infrequent 
attendance, and frequent attendance), hours worked per week, real weekly earned income, and 
real weekly other income (primarily income from allowances).
14  The labels given to certain 
variables are somewhat arbitrary.  For example, weekly earnings and other income reflect 
command over real resources.  We use each income measure and hours of work as regressors 
because exposure to the work environment may affect marijuana consumption by channels other 
than pure income effects.     
To capture youths’ perceptions and attitudes toward marijuana, we include an index of 
the youth’s perceived risk of harm from regular use of marijuana.  This item was not included on 
all survey forms in all survey years, so the sample size is reduced when it is included in the 38 
analysis.
15  The indicator of perceived risk is set equal to zero for youths that report no risk, 
equal to 1 for youths that report a slight risk, equal to 2 for those that report moderate risk and 
equal to 3 for those who report great risk associated with regular marijuana use.  
It is clear from the existing literature that peer use of substances has an important impact 
on the susceptibility of youths to use different substances.  Although we do not have any direct 
measure of friends’ use of particular substances, it is possible to construct school-level measures 
by aggregating responses to each of these questions for all youths in the same school that 
participated in the survey.
16  An indicator of the fraction of individuals reporting marijuana use 
in the past 30 days is used as a proxy for peer use of marijuana. This variable is almost certainly 
endogenous.  Unfortunately, appropriate instruments are not available.  Given this, some of the 
models presented below do not include the peer marijuana use measure.  
There were originally 193,796 observations in the 1985-1996 pooled sample.  
Approximately 28 percent of this sample is lost due to missing observations on gender, race, age, 
marital status, number of siblings, parental education, mother work status, living arrangements, 
place of residence, religious participation, employment status, and income.  Means of all 
variables except for marijuana participation and harm are based on 138,933 observations.  
Marijuana participation is known for 136,595 of these cases.  The harm measure is available for 
73,068 cases.   
The commercial marijuana prices described in the last section are matched to MTF 
counties in which the high schools are located based on an algorithm that matches each county in 
the United States to the three nearest cities in the 19 cities database.  Three matches are made 
rather than one due to missing data for certain cities in some years.
17  The price of marijuana in a 
given year is taken from the best or closest match.  Since the wholesale commercial price has 39 
fewer missing values than the retail commercial price, the former price is used in the demand 
functions estimated in this section.  All price coefficients in the tables have, however, been 
multiplied by 0.5--the coefficient of the retail price in a regression in which the wholesale price 
is the dependent variable.
18  The potency of commercial marijuana is the same variable 
employed in Section III and varies by time but not by city.  
To capture potential cross-price effects associated with the consumption of cigarettes and 
alcohol, we include the real state tax on a pack of twenty cigarettes, the real state tax on a case of 
24 12-ounce cans of beer, and the state minimum legal age for the purchase and consumption of 
beer with alcohol content of 3.2 percent or less.  The beer tax and legal drinking age are 
employed as measures of the cost of alcohol because beer is the beverage of choice among 
youths who consume alcohol.   Nominal state-level cigarette taxes were obtained from the 
Tobacco Institute’s annual Tax Burden on Tobacco and deflated by the national CPI  
(1982-1984 = 1).  Since taxes are reported as of Nov. 1 and the MTF interviews take place in the 
spring of each year, we use the average of the current year’s tax and last year’s tax to obtain a 
better estimate of the tax at the time of the MTF interview. We similarly construct a measure of 
the average real state tax on a case of 24 12-ounce cans of beer using quarterly tax information 
from Beer Institute’s Brewers’ Almanac.  The real state tax in a given year is calculated as the 
average of the current year’s first and second quarter and the previous year’s third and fourth 
quarter.
19   
  The minimum legal drinking age for beer was taken from Chaloupka, Saffer, and 
Grossman (1993).  By July 1988, all states had minimum drinking ages of twenty-one.  Many 
enacted “grandfather clauses,” however, exempting state residents of legal age prior to the 
increase.  The drinking age measure accounts for these clauses and does not become twenty-one 40 
in all states until 1991.
20  
The full price of consuming marijuana consists of the money price and the monetary 
value of the expected penalties for possession or use (the probability of apprehension and 
conviction multiplied by the fine or the monetary value of the prison sentence).  For a variety of 
reasons, we have excluded measures of expected penalties for possession of marijuana from the 
demand functions.  The marijuana decriminalization indicator discussed in Section II is a time-
invariant variable during our sample period.  Thus, it is perfectly collinear with the set of state 
dummies that are included in all models.
21   
In the case of monetary fines for possession of marijuana, Chaloupka, Grossman, and 
Tauras (1999) find that youths who reside in states with higher fines are less likely to consume 
marijuana.  Their estimated effects are, however, very small and do not control for unmeasured 
state characteristics.  Farrelly et al. (1999) find no effects when these controls are included.  The 
fine measure assembled by Farrelly and his colleagues is missing for all states for the years 1986, 
1987, and 1989.  There is no trend in the real fine during the sample period.  Therefore, it cannot 
explain the trend in marijuana use.  Moreover, preliminary results for the period 1990 through 
1996 revealed that the real fine for the possession of one ounce of marijuana did not have a 
significant effect on participation or frequency when state fixed effects were included.  
The probability of arrest for marijuana possession in an area is not observed since the 
number of users is not known.  The arrest rate for possession (arrests divided by population) is 
available at the county level and could be employed as a regressor.  A natural objection to this 
measure is that it reflects reverse causality: an increase in the number of users causes the number 
of arrests to rise.  A somewhat more subtle analysis recognizes that, if the arrest rate replaces the 
probability of arrest in the demand function, the coefficient of the former variable is positive if 41 
the elasticity of the probability of use with respect to the probability of arrest is greater than one 
in absolute value.  On the other hand, the arrest coefficient is negative if the elasticity just 
defined is less than one in absolute value.  Nevertheless, the estimated arrest coefficient is 
inconsistent unless an instrumental variables procedure is employed.  This is because the arrest 
rate is correlated with unmeasured determinants of marijuana participation and because of 
reverse causality from participation to arrests.   
  The above points are spelled out in more detail in the Appendix.  Here we note that we 
lack a suitable instrument for the arrest rate.  We also note that there is no trend in this measure 
during the sample period.  Finally, in preliminary estimates we included the state-specific per 
capita number of juveniles in custody for the years 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993 obtained 
from Levitt (1998).  This variable has a negative and significant effect on marijuana 
participation, but it results in the loss of seven of the twelve cross sections and has no trend.  
Moreover, it reflects the combined impact of the removal of potential users from the non-
institutional population and deterrence.   Therefore, we do not employ it in the final models 
presented in Section IV.B.   
  To parallel the models obtained in Section III and to include marijuana potency as a 
determinant, we obtain three basic equations.  The first omits a time trend, the second includes a 
linear trend in which 1985 = 0 and 1996 = 11, and the third includes time and time squared.  All 
equations contain dichotomous variables for 45 of the 46 states in the repeat cross sections.  
Robust or Huber (1967) standard errors of logit and regression coefficients are obtained.  They 
allow for state/year clustering.      
  The conceptual issues raised with regard to the appropriateness of including the harm 
measure in the time-series demand functions in Section III.D also apply to the micro-level 42 
demand functions. This same concern applies to including the measure of peer marijuana use. 
The many pitfalls involved in obtaining peer effects have been discussed in detail by Manski 
(1993), and our estimated effects should be interpreted with caution. 
 
IV.B.  Results        
  Table 6 contains maximum likelihood logit equations for annual marijuana participation, 
and Table 7 contains comparable estimates for thirty-day marijuana participation.  Three models 
are shown in each table.  The first omits a time trend; the second includes a linear trend; and the 
third includes the trend and its square.  The harm and peer marijuana use variables are excluded 
from the models in these tables. 
  Given the pronounced trends in the real price of marijuana, the potency of marijuana, and 
the minimum legal drinking age during the relatively short period at issue, the coefficients of 
these variables are sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of a trend term and to the exact 
specification of the trend. A case can be made that the specifications with the quadratic trend 
represent an “overparamaterization” of the data since the computations in Section III and those at 
the end of this section suggest that trends in the variables just mentioned provide plausible 
explanations of trends in participation.  Moreover, we have reasonably good proxies for such 
hard-to-measure variables as attitudes (as indicated by perceived risk of harm) and peer behavior.  
Nevertheless, we present all three models to indicate the degree to which the estimates vary and 
to allow the reader to make up his or her own mind on this issue. 
  The marijuana price coefficient is negative and significant in the three models in Table 6 
and in the first two models in Table 7.  Evaluated at sample means, the price elasticity of annual 
marijuana participation ranges from -0.33 in the equation with no trend to -0.06 in the equation 43 
with a quadratic trend.  The elasticity estimates for thirty-day participation are quite similar and 
follow the same pattern, ranging from –0.34 in the equation with no trend to –0.002 in the 
equation with a quadratic trend.    The estimates in Tables 6 and 7 are much more sensitive to the 
inclusion of trend terms than those in Tables 2 and 3 most likely because the data in the latter 
span a longer period of time.   
  As in the time-series regressions, an increase in the potency of commercial marijuana 
increases participation, except when a quadratic trend is entered.  The potency elasticity of 0.48 
in model 1 for annual participation is fairly similar to the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
0.33 in that specification.  These results are consistent with the framework outlined in Section III 
in which participation decisions are based on quality-adjusted price.  The potency elasticity of 
0.88 in the second model in Table 6 is not consistent with this framework.  A similar pattern is 
observed for thirty-day participation.  
  There is some evidence from both tables that beer and marijuana are complements.  All 
six of the beer tax coefficients are negative, albeit generally not significant.  In the annual 
participation models that control for time, the beer tax participation effects are significant at 
approximately the 20 percent level on a two-tailed test but not at the 10 percent level.
22  An 
increase in the legal drinking age has significant negative effects on annual and thirty-day 
participation, except in the models with the quadratic time trend.  In those models, the effect is 
positive and significant, implying substitution rather than complementarity.  This finding again 
suggests that it is difficult to sort out unmeasured trend impacts from those of variables with 
significant trends.     
Five of the six cigarette tax coefficients are positive, but none are close to significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that cigarettes and marijuana are neither substitutes nor 44 
complements. 
  Our finding of negative beer tax effects is similar to that reported by Pacula (1998a, 
1998b) and Farrelly et al. (1999).  Pacula also reports an inverse relationship between the 
drinking age and marijuana participation.  DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) report a positive 
relationship between these two variables, and we have no explanation of why their results differ 
from ours.  Chaloupka et al. (1999) and Farrelly et al. (1999) contain evidence of either no 
relationship or complementarity between cigarettes and marijuana.  The former study does not, 
however, control for state fixed effects, and neither study includes a measure of the money price 
of marijuana. 
  The effects of the individual and family characteristics are consistent with those found in 
the literature and will not be discussed in any detail.  Youths of more educated parents, youths 
who do not live with both parents, and youths whose mothers’ worked full- or part-time while 
they grew up are more likely to have tried marijuana in the past year; while youths who are 
married or engaged are less likely to have done so.  Similar differentials are observed for thirty-
day participation. 
  Hours worked per week, weekly earned income, and weekly other income (primarily 
income from allowances) have positive coefficients in all demand functions.  The earned income 
effect would be larger if hours worked were omitted.  As already pointed out, the impact of 
earnings might reflect forces associated with the workplace environment.  This comment does 
not apply to other income, so that its coefficients can be attributed to command over real 
resources.  The other income elasticity of annual participation equals 0.03.  While this elasticity 
is modest, other income accounts for only 22.5 percent of total weekly income.  Hence, the 
corresponding elasticity with respect to total income is 0.13.       45 
  Based on t-ratios, frequent religious service attendance is the most important correlate of 
marijuana participation.  The ratio of the odds of annual marijuana participation for those who 
attend services frequently compared to those who do not of 0.36 is dramatic.  Evaluated at 
sample means, the probability of annual marijuana participation for a youth who never attends 
religious services is 0.41, while the probability for a youth who attends these services frequently 
is 0.21. A similar pattern is observed for thirty-day participation. 
  Since there is no cross-sectional variation in potency, we also explored a specification in 
which potency was deleted from the set of independent variables and dichotomous indicators for 
each of the twelve years from 1985 through 1996 were included.  This logit equation was forced 
through the origin.  The results (not shown) are very similar to those in the specifications with 
the quadratic time trend in Tables 6 and 7 and produce similar elasticity estimates.   
  Following Moulton (1986), we regressed the coefficients of the time dummies on 
potency.  These regressions, which contained twelve observations, were weighted by the square 
root of the inverse of the standard errors of the coefficients of the time dummies.  The potency 
coefficient was positive and not significant, suggesting that the time effects cannot be explained 
by the trend in potency.  A positive and insignificant potency effect also emerges from the model 
with the quadratic trend.  These findings imply that the most flexible trend specification adds 
little to the quadratic specification.    
  Table 8 contains selected coefficients from annual and thirty-day participation logit 
equations that include the index of perceived risk of harm from regular use of marijuana (harm) 
and peer marijuana use in specifications that are otherwise the same as those in Tables 6 and 7.  
The sample size is reduced by approximately 50 percent when the harm index is included 
because it is not included on all MTF forms.  When the models excluding harm and peer 46 
marijuana use in Tables 6 and 7 were estimated on the smaller sample, the coefficients of the 
variables in the price vector were almost identical to those presented in the tables. 
  The models in Table 8 show that harm and peer marijuana use are highly correlated with 
marijuana participation.  An increase in the perceived risk of harm significantly lowers the 
probability of participation, while an increase in peer marijuana use significantly raises this 
probability. Evaluated at sample means, the marginal effect of an increase in peer marijuana use 
on the probability of marijuana use in the past year is approximately equal to 0.55 in each of the 
three models.  In other words, if the fraction of peers who used marijuana rose from 0.31 (the 
sample mean) to 0.47 (a one-standard deviation increase), the probability that a youth used 
marijuana in the past year would rise from 0.31 to 0.39. Similar effects are observed for thirty-
day participation.   
  Not surprisingly, the significant price effects are reduced in absolute value when harm 
and peer marijuana use are added to the set of regressors.  In discussing this phenomenon, we 
focus on the models without the quadratic trend term.  Unlike the pseudo R-squared measures in 
Table 6 and 7, those in Table 8 are the same (to three decimal places) in models with and without 
the quadratic trend. The coefficients on the time-squared variable in model 3 are almost 90 
percent smaller than the corresponding coefficients in Tables 6 and 7. The coefficients of time 
itself in model 3 are over more than 70 percent smaller than the same coefficients in the third 
model in Tables 6 and 7.  While the inclusion of the square of time has a dramatic effect on the 
coefficient of time in Table 6, it has less of an impact in the specifications contained in Table 8.  
These results imply that the quadratic trend specification adds little in equations that include 
harm and peer marijuana use. 
  The price elasticities of marijuana participation in Table 8 are smaller than those 47 
contained in Tables 6 and 7.  The estimates in Table 8, however, hold peer participation constant.  
When the price of marijuana falls, peer participation increases.  Thus, there is both a direct effect 
of price on participation with peer participation held constant and an indirect effect that operates 
through peer participation.  The price elasticity of the market demand function for participation 
incorporates both effects.  
 Let  ε  be the price elasticity of the demand function that holds peer participation constant, 
and let α  be the marginal effect of peer participation.  Then the market price elasticity is  
ε /(1 - α ).  The market price elasticity in each of the models is contained in the last row of each 
panel in Table 8.  The annual participation market price elasticities range from –0.466 to –0.260, 
while those for thirty-day participation range from –0.694 to –0.093.  These estimates are larger 
than the corresponding values in Tables 6 and 7, with the exception of the second model for 
thirty-day participation.  They suggest that the market price elasticity may be underestimated 
when it is obtained by simply excluding peer participation from the demand function.  This 
conclusion is very tentative given the likely endogeneity of the peer marijuana use measure      
  We conclude this section by evaluating the contribution of key determinants to the 
reduction in marijuana participation between 1982 and 1992 and to the expansion in participation 
since 1992.  National values of marijuana participation and the determinants considered in 1982, 
1992, and 1998 are shown in Table 9.  Our analysis is based on the three models in Tables 6, 7 
and 8. 
  Before the results are presented, a number of comments on the computations that underlie 
them are in order.  First, the figures in Table 10 pertain to a period that is longer than the one 
spanned by the repeated cross sections.  Results for the 1985-1992 contraction and the 1992-
1996 expansion are, however, very similar to those in Table 10.  Second, the percentage of 48 
youths who used marijuana in the past year or the past thirty days (the probability of 
participation multiplied by 100) are nonlinear functions of their determinants in the logit 
functions.  Given this and our aim to isolate the contribution of specific variables, we base our 
computations on linear probability of participation equations estimated by ordinary least squares.  
Marginal effects that emerge from the logit equations are very similar to the corresponding 
regression coefficients in the linear probability equations.  The same comment applies to 
elasticities at sample means in the logit and linear probability models.   
  Third, given our focus on marijuana price, potency, and harm, we exclude the individual 
and family characteristics, the cigarette and beer taxes, and the minimum legal drinking age from 
the computations, although the regressions that they are derived from include these variables.      
  Finally, the computations based on regressions that include peer marijuana use employ 
coefficients from the market demand function.  These are coefficients that hold peer participation 
constant divided by one minus the coefficient of peer participation.  This is appropriate because 
basic determinants may have important indirect effects operating through peer participation.  
Moreover, at the national level the mean value of peer participation coincides with the fraction of 
high school seniors who used marijuana.  Clearly, one does not want to hold this variable 
constant when examining national trends in participation.   
  Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 10 allow one to compare the predicted effects of changes in 
the real quality-adjusted price of marijuana and the perceived risk of harm from regular use on 
participation, holding all else constant.    An average of the components in these three models 
suggests that changes in the quality-adjusted price predict approximately 55 percent of the 50 
percent decline in the annual participation rate between 1982 and 1992.  The changes in harm 
predict more than 40 percent of this decline.  The comparable estimates for the nearly 60 percent 49 
decline in thirty day participation during this period are 22 percent for quality-adjusted price and 
nearly 100 percent for harm. 
With regard to the recent expansion in marijuana participation, changes in quality-
adjusted price appear to have little predictive power in explaining the increases in use, largely 
because of the opposing effects of price and potency on participation during this period.  If the 
effects of potency are ignored (given the insignificant effects of potency in the models including 
time trends), the changes in the real price of marijuana predict about 20 percent of the 
approximate doubling in the annual participation rate between 1992 and 1998 and approximately 
15 percent of the somewhat larger increase in the thirty-day participation rate.  The observed 
changes in harm predict over 80 percent of the growth in annual participation, but imply more 
than double the observed increases in thirty-day participation.     
  We interpret these estimates as generally similar to those based on the time-series 
regressions in Section III.  It should be kept in mind that these estimates are biased and perhaps 
overstated if the coefficient of the endogenous peer marijuana participation measure is biased 
upwards.       
  One additional aspect of the results in Table 10 is worth mentioning.  The price 
components (not adjusted for quality) in models 1, 2, and 3, which exclude harm and peer 
participation, are usually smaller than the corresponding components in models 4, 5, and 6.  This 
is not surprising and is consistent with our finding that the market price elasticity obtained from a 
demand function that includes peer participation is larger than the elasticity obtained by omitting 
peer participation as a regressor.   
V.  Discussion 
  Our most important contribution in this paper is to present the first estimates of the price 50 
elasticity of demand for the prevalence of marijuana use by high school seniors.  Our estimates 
of this parameter span a fairly wide range from -0.06 to -0.47 for annual participation and a 
similarly wide range from –0.002 to –0.69 for thirty-day participation.  These wide ranges can be 
attributed to a variety of factors.  The price and potency variables are subject to considerable 
measurement error.  Pronounced trends in price and several other key determinants make it 
difficult to sort out their effects from those due to unmeasured time effects.  Indeed, it may be 
inappropriate to include trend terms since we have very good proxies for hard-to-measure-
variables in a short time series.  Peer marijuana participation and perceptions concerning the risk 
of harm from regular marijuana use have large effects on the probability of participation.  Yet 
these two variables potentially are endogenous, and their coefficients, as well as those for price, 
may be biased.  Given these considerations, a conservative lower-bound estimate of the price 
elasticity of demand for marijuana participation is -0.30. 
  Our estimates imply that cycles in the real (inflation-adjusted) price of marijuana and in 
the perceived risk of harm from regular marijuana use contribute to an understanding of cycles in 
the number of high school seniors who use marijuana.  The estimation of the relative effects of 
price and harm is complicated by a variety of factors.   Price and potency are measured with 
error.  Several key determinants are endogenous.  Attitudinal variables other than a single 
indicator of perceived risk of harm from regular marijuana use, and other potentially important 
variables that are correlated with harm and price have been omitted.  In addition, analyses of 
different time periods could produce somewhat different estimates; the analyses contained in this 
paper (given the limited data available on price) begin in 1982, several years after the start of the 
downturn in marijuana use and the substantial rise in perceived risk that preceded it.  Given these 
considerations, we have provided a wide range of estimates. These estimates clearly imply that 51 
changes in the real, quality-adjusted price of marijuana contributed significantly to the trends in 
youth marijuana use between 1982 and 1998, particularly during the contraction in use from 
1982 to 1992.  Similarly, changes in youth perceptions of the harms associated with regular 
marijuana use had a substantial impact on both the contraction in use during the 1982 through 
1992 period and the subsequent expansion in use after 1992.  
   As clearly described above, our estimates of the magnitudes of the price and attitudinal 
effects are subject to significant variation and should not be considered definitive. Research that 
focuses on outcomes other than annual and thirty-day participation, and that employs a wider 
range of attitudinal measures, better data on price and potency, and additional measures of the 
full price of youth marijuana use is required to provide a more complete understanding of the 
relative impact of price and attitudes on youth marijuana use.  Similarly, studies that construct 
and estimate structural models that treat peer behavior, risk perceptions, and marijuana 
consumption decisions as endogenous deserve high priority for future investigations.  These 
studies would be especially valuable if they could identify the basic forces that cause attitudes 
and perhaps price and potency to vary.  In the absence of this research and as a prelude to it, the 
main message of this paper is that is useful to consider price in addition to more traditional 
determinants in any analysis of marijuana consumption decisions made by youths.  52 
Appendix 
  In this appendix we examine problems that arise when the marijuana arrest rate 
(marijuana possession arrests divided by population) replaces the probability of arrest (arrests 
divided by the number of marijuana users) in the demand function for the probability of 
marijuana participation.  We assume that the probability of use of a representative individual or 
the number of users divided by the population (u) at the aggregate level depends on the 
probability of arrest (π ):   
   u  =  u(π ), ∂ u/∂π   <   0 .         ( 1 )  
Note that we do not distinguish between the probability of arrest and the probability of 
conviction given apprehension and ignore components of the full price of marijuana other than π . 
  If a is the arrest rate (arrests divided by population), then 
   a   =   u π .           ( 2 )  
From equation (1), 
   ∂ ln u/∂ ln a = (∂ ln u/∂ ln π )*(∂ ln π /∂ ln  a).     (3) 
Define the elasticity of u with respect to π  as  
   ε  ≡  ∂ ln u/∂ ln π .        ( 4 )  
Note that ε  is analogous to the price elasticity of demand.  As we have defined this elasticity, it is 
negative.  From equation (2), 
   ( ∂ ln a/∂ ln π ) = 1 + ε .         ( 5 )  
  An increase in the probability of arrest increases the arrest rate if ε  is smaller than 1 in 
absolute value but decreases the arrest rate if ε  exceeds I in absolute value.  This is perfectly 
analogous to the effect of an increase in price on total revenue.  Revenue rises if the price 
elasticity of demand is less than 1 in absolute value and falls if the price elasticity of demand 53 
exceeds 1.  Of course, this is because the arrest rate corresponds to total revenue and the 
probability of arrest corresponds to price.  The arrest rate is a positive correlate of the probability 
of arrest if -ε  < 1, but the arrest rate is a negative correlate of the probability of arrest if -ε  > 1.  
For -ε  = 1, there is no relationship between these two variables; an increase in π  lowers u but has 
no impact on a. 
  From equations (4) and (5), 
   φ  ≡  (∂ ln u/∂ ln a) = ε /(1 + ε ).       (6) 
In words a regression of ln u on ln a gives an estimate of φ  = ε /(1 + ε ).   The parameter φ  is 
negative if ε  is smaller than 1 in absolute value, while φ  is positive and greater than 1 if ε  is 
greater than 1 in absolute value. 
 Given  φ , one can obtain ε  from 
   ε  = φ /(1 - φ ) .          ( 7 )  
This shows why φ  must exceed 1 if it is positive.  Given φ  > 0, ε  is negative if and only if φ  > 1.  
Put differently, the theory places restrictions on the value of φ .   
  To explore estimation issues in more detail, consider a demand function for u that is 
linear in the ln u and ln π : 
   l n   u   =   ε ln π   +   x ,         ( 8 )  
where x stands for an unobserved factor or the disturbance term in the regression.  Other 
observed determinants are suppressed.  Since ln π  = ln a - ln u, 
   ln  u  =  [ε /(1 + ε )]ln a + [1/(1 + ε )]x.      (9) 54 
With π  held constant, an increase in x raises u by assumption.  But with a held constant, an 
increase in x raises u only if ε  is smaller than 1 in absolute value.  The reason is that the only 
way to fix a when u varies is for π  to vary.  Indeed, since ln a = ln u + ln π , 
      l n  a   =  ( ε  + 1) ln π   +   x .       ( 1 0 )    
 With  π  held constant, x and a are positively related; unmeasured factors that increase use 
also will increase arrests.  This is the intuition behind the proposition that the coefficient of ln a 
is biased upward because arrests are high when use is high.  Arrests and x are positively related, 
but the coefficient of the omitted variable x is positive only if ε  is smaller than 1 in absolute 
value.  In that case the estimate of φ , which is a negative parameter, is biased upward.  When -ε  
> 1, the coefficient of the omitted variable x is negative.  Hence the estimate of φ , which now is a 
positive parameter that exceeds 1, is biased downward.  Indeed, since the coefficient of x on ln a 
is normalized at 1, the expected value of the coefficient of ln a in the demand function is equal to 
1 regardless of the value of ε .  
  So far we have assumed that π  is exogenous.  Now we follow Ehrlich (1973) and specify 
a production function for the probability of apprehension and conviction 
   l n   π  = α ln g + β ln  u  +  y.       (11) 
The new variable, g, stands for resources allocated to police and courts and α  is positive.  The 
variably y stands for an unmeasured determinant.  Ehrlich assumes that β  is negative.  He argues 
that the productivity of g is likely to be lower at higher levels of criminal activity because more 
offenders must then be apprehended, charged, and tried in court in order to achieve a given level 
of π .  Thus with g held constant, u and π  might be negatively correlated, but the causality runs 
from u to π   55 
 Since  ln  π  = ln a - ln u, 
   l n   a   =   α ln g + (β  + 1) ln u + y.          (12)       
The coefficient of ln u is positive if -β  <1 and negative if -β  > 1.  For -β  = 1, the coefficient is 
zero.  Consider equations (9) and (12) as a simultaneous system with two endogenous variables: 
u and a.  From equation (12), the estimate of φ  is biased upward if -β  <1 both because of reverse 
causality from an increase in u to an increase in a and because of the positive correlation between 
x and a.  When -β  > 1, these two biases go in opposite directions. 56 
Footnotes 
  This is a revised version of a paper presented at a National Bureau of Economic Research 
Conference entitled “An Economic Analysis of Risky Behavior Among Youths” in Captiva 
Island, Florida, December 10-11, 1999.  The paper also was presented at the Fourth Biennial 
Pacific Rim Allied Economic Organization Conference in Sydney, Australia, January 11-16, 
2000 and at seminars at Vanderbilt University and the City University of New York Graduate 
School.  We are extremely grateful to John DiNardo, Jonathan Gruber, Robert Kaestner, John 
F.P. Bridges, and conference and seminar participants for helpful comments and suggestions.  
We are indebted to John F.P. Bridges, Dhaval Dave, and especially Deborah D. Kloska for 
research assistance.  We wish to thank to Nick Mastrocinque and Mark Redding of The Drug 
Enforcement Administration Intelligence Division for providing us with data from the Illegal 
Drug Price/Purity Report and for answering a variety of questions concerning these data.  We 
also wish to thank Steven D. Levitt for providing us with data on the per capita number of 
juveniles in custody.  Research for this paper was supported by grants from the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation to the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of Michigan, as 
part of the Foundation’s Bridging the Gap Initiative.  Monitoring the Future data were collected 
under a research grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (RO1 DA01411).  This paper 
has not undergone the review accorded official NBER publications; in particular, it has not been 
submitted for approval by the Board of Directors.  Any opinions expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation or NBER. 
 
1 Although alcohol is an illegal substance for teenagers, we use the term “illicit 
substance” to refer to those substances that are illegal for persons of all ages. 
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2 The authors note that higher values have been found among certain high risk 
populations, such as young men and people living in large cities. 
3 The estimated price elasticities reported in Sections III and IV are not subject to this 
bias because they employ prevailing market prices rather than prices paid by individual 
consumers.  
4 The MTF data contain other measures of youth attitudes towards marijuana, including 
the risk of harm from occasional marijuana use, the risk of harm from experimental use, and 
disapproval of regular, occasional, or daily use.  Given the length of this chapter and the 
complexity of analyses it contains, a more complete treatment of the attitudinal variables is not 
included.  While these measures are highly correlated, the use of different attitudinal measures is 
likely to have some impact on the estimates reported below.  Further consideration of these 
variables deserves high priority in future research. 
5 We assume that the data for 1982, 1983, and 1984 pertain to the second quarter of each 
year. 
6 Information on the nineteen-cities prices and the publications that contain them were 
kindly supplied by Nick Mastrocinque and Mark Redding of the DEA Intelligence Division.  It is 
not clear why the purchases on which these prices are based are not contained in STRIDE. 
7  If youth are more likely to use sinsemilla rather than commercial marijuana, then an 
additional source of measurement error is introduced into our models.  However, given the 
relatively high correlations between price and potency, the regression results obtained with 
alternative series are very similar to those reported in this chapter, suggesting that this is not a 
significant problem.   
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8 Becker and Mulligan (1997) develop an economic framework that highlights the 
incentives of parents to make investments that raise the future orientation of their children.  
Clearly, these investments can also alter attitudes and perceptions governing potentially risky 
behaviors.    
9 A positive correlation between price and harm also is possible.  Suppose that an 
increase in price is due to an expansion in resources allocated to enforcing marijuana laws.  If the 
expected penalty for possession of marijuana rises and if this penalty is one of the harms 
associated with use, price and harm would be positively related.    
 
10 The simplest way to prove this is to write the demand function as 
   l n   Q   =   α  - ε ln p*, 
where α  is a constant.  Using the definitions of Q and p* in the text, one can rewrite this demand 
function as 
   ln  m  =  α  - ε ln p + (ε  - 1)ln q.  
11 In terms of the model specified in the preceding note, the elasticity of participation 
with respect to q should equal the elasticity of participation with respect to p with the sign 
reversed.  This constraint could be imposed by employing p/q as the regressor in the demand 
function.  We do not take this approach because our measure of q does not distinguish between 
wholesale and retail potency and because THC content may not be the only determinant of 
quality.   
12 Additional measures of youth marijuana use, including frequency of use and 
participation in daily use, could be constructed from the MTF data.  Given the focus of this 
 59 
 
chapter, these outcomes are not considered.  A more complete analysis of these measures should 
be a priority for future research. 
13 One-sixth of the MTF sample are asked separate questions about marijuana and 
hashish.  These answers have been aggregated to form indicators of the use of any form of 
marijuana.  
14 As in Section III, variables are converted from nominal to real dollars by deflating by 
the Consumer Price Index for the United States as a whole (1982-84 = 1).   
15 From 1985-1989, five different questionnaires were administered in each year, 
enabling investigators to increase the range of questions being asked without making any given 
questionnaire too long.  From 1985-1988, only one form included the question on perceived risk 
(Form 5).  In 1989, a sixth questionnaire form was added to the survey and the risk item was 
included on this sixth form.  In 1990, the perceived risk question was added to three of the 
existing forms, making it available on five of the forms.  As noted above, additional attitudinal 
measures are contained in the MTF surveys and the use of alternative measures could have some 
impact on the estimates presented in this chapter.  However, space constraints prohibit a 
complete examination of all of these measures.  Further examination of these alternative 
attitudinal measures should be a high priority for future research in this area.  
16 Classes are chosen within in each school to be representative of the high school 
students within that school.  This is a standard part of the multi-stage random sampling 
procedure. 
17 If the price is missing for all three matches, the observation is deleted.  
18 Let r be the retail price, w be the wholesale price, and m be a measure of marijuana 
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consumption.  Then ∂ m/∂ r = (∂ m/∂ w)(∂ w/∂ r).  
19 The benefits of adopting similar algorithms in the case of the marijuana price were 
outweighed by the amount of measurement error that they would create in an already “noisy” 
variable.  
20 The drinking age is a weighted average of the daily effective drinking age in the state 
and takes account of the month in which the age was raised.    
21 Alaska re-criminalized the possession of a small quantity of marijuana in 1990, but that 
state does not appear in MTF during the 1985-1996 period.  Arizona decriminalized marijuana 
possession in 1994 but is not contained in MTF after that year.    
22 A two-tailed test is appropriate because the sign of the coefficient is ambiguous in 
theory.     61 
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ANNUAL MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION REGRESSIONS
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Panel A: Price and Harm Entered Separately 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price  -3.205 -3.167 -2.122       
  (-7.83) (-3.27) (-2.59)       
          
Potency 4.074  4.120  -0.406       
 (4.04)  (2.59)  (-0.37)       
           
Time   -0.020  -3.326    -0.861  -1.400 
   (-0.06)  (-3.10)    (-4.50)  (-1.08) 
           
Time squared      0.192      0.032 
     (3.30)      (0.41) 
           
Harm      -0.590  -0.746  -0.656 
      (-2.95)  (-5.91)  (-3.19) 
           
R-squared  0.723 0.723 0.851  0.446  0.839  0.841 
           
F-statistic  93.54 60.70 31.96  8.70  20.27  12.03 
          
Price elasticity 
b  -0.407 -0.402 -0.269       
        
Panel B: Price and Harm Entered Together 
 (7)  (8)  (9) 
Price -2.408  -1.595  -1.626 
 (-5.81)  (-2.08)  (-2.01) 
      
Potency 0.263  0.776  0.411 
 (0.26)  (0.76)  (0.32) 
      
Time   -0.385  -0.949 
   (-1.28)  (-0.79) 
      
Time squared      0.036 
     (0.53) 
      
Harm -0.517  -0.567  -0.485 
 (-4.47)  (-4.20)  (-3.55) 
      
R-squared 0.866  0.881  0.882 
      
F-statistic 96.74  45.94  42.38 
      
Price elasticity 
b  -0.306 -0.203  -0.206 
 
a Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors on which they are based allow for 
heteroscedasticity and for autocorrelation up to and including a lag of 3.  Intercepts are not shown. 
 
b Evaluated at sample means.74 
TABLE 3 
 
THIRTY-DAY MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION REGRESSIONS
a 
 
Panel A: Price and Harm Entered Separately 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price -2.280  -2.079  -1.156       
 (-6.73)  (-2.80)  (-2.16)       
            
Potency 3.100  3.341  -0.657       
 (4.31)  (2.85)  (-1.04)       
          
Time    -0.105 -3.025    -0.632 -0.881 
   (-0.38)  (-4.28)    (-5.76)  (-1.20) 
          
Time  squared     0.169     0.015 
     (4.49)     (0.34) 
         
Harm       -0.471  -0.586  -0.545 
       (-3.32)  (-8.79)  (-4.79) 
         
R-squared  0.679 0.682 0.863 0.518  0.904 0.904 
         
F-statistic  78.02 57.30 26.30 11.03  40.74 26.55 
         
Price elasticity 
b  -0.483 -0.441 -0.245       
        
Panel B: Price and Harm Entered Together 
 (7)  (8)  (9) 
Price -1.577  -0.658  -0.673 
 (-4.47)  (-1.33)  (-1.34) 
      
Potency -0.263  0.318  0.140 
 (-0.31)  (0.52)  (0.21) 
      
Time   -0.435  -0.710 
   (-2.15)  (-1.07) 
      
Time squared      0.017 
     (0.51) 
      
Harm -0.456  -0.512  -0.473 
 (-5.18)  (-6.04)  (-5.66) 
      
      
R-squared 0.855  0.916  0.917 
      
F-statistic 155.50  73.65  57.86 
      
Price elasticity
 b  -0.331 -0.139  -0.143 
 
a Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors on which they are based allow for 
heteroscedasticity and for autocorrelation up to and including a lag of 3.  Intercepts are not shown. 
 




PERCENTAGE-POINT IMPACTS OF PRICE, POTENCY, AND HARM ON MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Panel A:  Annual Participation 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
1982-1992, Observed Change in Participation = -22.40 
 
Marijuana  price  -13.88  -13.72  -9.19      -10.43  -6.91  -7.04 
Marijuana  potency -4.52 -4.57  0.45        -0.29 -0.86 -0.46 
Harm        -9.49  -12.02  -10.57  -8.32  -9.12  -7.81 
Total predicted  



















           
1992-1998, Observed Change in Participation = 15.60 
 
Marijuana  price  3.10 3.06 2.05        2.33 1.54 1.57 
Marijuana  potency 8.31 8.40  -0.83        0.54 1.58 0.84 
Harm        10.61  13.44  11.81  9.30  10.20  8.74 
Total predicted  



















           
Panel B: Thirty-Day Participation 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
1982-1992, Observed Change in Participation = -16.60 
Marijuana  price  -9.88 -9.01 -5.01        -6.83 -2.85 -2.91 
Marijuana  potency -3.44 -3.71  0.73        0.29 -0.35 -0.16 
Harm        -7.59 -9.44 -8.11 -7.34 -8.25 -7.61 
Total predicted  



















           
1992-1998, Observed Change in Participation = 10.90 
Marijuana  price  2.20 2.01 1.12        1.52 0.64 0.65 
Marijuana  potency 6.32 6.82  -1.34        -0.54 0.65 0.29 
Harm        8.48  10.56 9.80 8.21 9.22 8.51 
Total predicted  




















Estimates for annual participation are based on the specifications in Table 2; estimates for thirty-day 
participation are based on the specifications in Table 3. 





                                                                                                                                         Pooled Sample 
                                                                                                                                             N = 138,933 
VARIABLE Mean  Std.  Dev.   
           INDICATORS OF MARIJUANA USE   
Annual prevalence of marijuana use  0.311  0.463  
Thirty-day prevalence of marijuana use    0.184  0.388  
           DEMOGRAPHICS    
Male 0.484  0.500   
Black non-Hispanic  0.097  0.296  
Hispanic 0.063  0.242   
Other race  0.068  0.251  
Age 17.948  0.559   
Siblings: Total number of siblings  2.490  1.839  
Father had some high school  0.115  0.319  
Father finished high school plus (finished high school or attended or graduated 
college)  
0.840 0.367   
Mother had some high school  0.101  0.302  
Mother finished high school plus   0.867  0.340  
Mother worked full-time  0.515  0.500  
Mother worked part-time  0.266  0.442  
Live alone  0.006  0.079  
Live with father only  0.035  0.184  
Live with mother only  0.158  0.364  
Other living arrangement  0.044  0.205  
City: Live in a city   0.591  0.492  
Suburb: Live in a suburb   0.211  0.408  
         LIFESTYLE FACTORS      
Infrequent religious service attendance  0.538  0.499  
Frequent religious service attendance  0.335  0.472  
Married or engaged  0.075  0.263  
Hours worked per week  13.298  10.521  
Earned income: Real weekly earned income  37.299  34.221  
Other income: Real weekly other income  10.842   17.882  
         ATTITUDES & PERCEPTIONS      
Harm: Perceived risk of harm from regular marijuana use (0 = no risk, 1 = 
slight risk, 2 = moderate risk, 3 = great risk) 
2.607 0.742   
         MEASURES OF PEER USE      
Peer marijuana use: Fraction who used marijuana in past month in 
respondent’s school  
0.180 0.090   
          PRICE OF MARIJUANA      
Marijuana price: Real retail price of one gram of commercial marijuana   3.325  1.280  
Marijuana potency: Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) potency of 
commercial marijuana as a percentage     
3.856 0.470 
         SUBSTITUTE/COMPLEMENT PRICES      
Cigarette tax: Real state tax on a pack of cigarettes   0.180  0.085  
Beer tax: Real state tax on case of 24 12-ounce cans of beer   0.493  0.498  
Drinking age: State minimum legal age for purchase and consumption of beer, 
alcoholic content 3.2 percent or less 
20.812 0.567   
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TABLE   6 
 
ANNUAL MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION LOGIT EQUATIONS
a 
(N=135,970) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Male  0.176 0.177 0.182 
  (10.34) (10.48) (10.83) 
Black  -0.738 -0.739 -0.739 
  (-16.58) (-16.68) (-17.16) 
Hispanic  -0.187 -0.179 -0.161 
  (-4.11) (-3.94) (-3.61) 
Other race  -0.547 -0.540 -0.540 
  (-11.11) (-11.02) (-11.43) 
Age  -0.026 -0.022 -0.021 
  (-2.31) (-1.96) (-1.85) 
Siblings  0.046 0.044 0.043 
  (11.31) (10.93) (10.50) 
Father had some high school  0.100 0.100 0.103 
  (2.48) (2.49) (2.53) 
Father finished high school plus  0.114 0.118 0.120 
  (3.01) (3.09) (3.10) 
Mother had some high school  0.304 0.298 0.305 
  (6.15) (6.06) (6.16) 
Mother finished high school plus  0.370 0.366 0.370 
  (7.79) (7.76) (7.83) 
Mother worked part-time  0.101 0.101 0.098 
  (5.49) (5.50) (5.27) 
Mother worked full-time  0.137 0.142 0.137 
  (8.92) (9.23) (8.84) 
Live alone  0.434 0.439 0.441 
  (5.75) (5.83) (5.82) 
Live with father only  0.254 0.256 0.260 
  (7.76) (7.80) (7.98) 
Live with mother only  0.176 0.176 0.178 
  (9.87) (9.89) (9.99) 
Other living arrangement  0.335 0.335 0.340 
  (10.93) (10.89) (11.06) 
City  0.377 0.374 0.375 
  (14.04) (14.00) (14.33) 
Suburb  0.474 0.471 0.483 
  (15.08) (15.23) (15.76) 








Frequent religious service attendance  -0.991 -0.995 -1.002 
  (-40.08) (-40.35) (-40.74) 
Married or engaged  -0.082 -0.082 -0.086 
  (-3.06) (-3.05) (-3.18) 
Hours worked per week  0.011 0.011 0.011 
  (11.31) (11.67) (11.77) 
Earned income  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (7.65) (7.23) (7.26) 
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
      
      
Other income  0.009 0.009 0.009 
  (23.53) (23.50) (23.44) 
Cigarette tax  -0.042 0.337 0.068 
  (-0.08) (0.69) (0.26) 
Beer tax  -0.679 -0.416 -0.198 
  (-2.29) (-1.34) (-1.26) 
Drinking age  -0.129 -0.063  0.096 
  (-3.64) (-1.65)  (2.74) 
Marijuana price  -0.145 -0.103 -0.027 
  (-7.95) (-5.15) (-1.77) 
Marijuana potency  0.181 0.331 0.002 
  (4.80) (6.21) (0.05) 
Time   -0.043  -0.286 
   (-3.78)  (-17.68) 
Time squared     0.023 
     (16.52) 
     
Pseudo R-squared  0.066 0.067 0.071 
Chi-squared  8355.91 8425.21 8633.30 
Price elasticity
b  -0.331 -0.235 -0.063 
 
             a All equations include state dummies.  Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.   
          Huber (1967) or robust standard errors on which they are based allow for  
          state/year clustering.  Intercepts are not shown. 
 





THIRTY-DAY MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION LOGIT EQUATIONS
a 
(N=135,8231) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Male  0.280 0.281 0.286 
  (14.89) (15.07) (15.49) 
Black  -0.659 -0.660 -0.658 
  (-12.35) (-12.38) (-12.83) 
Hispanic  -0.197 -0.189 -0.169 
  (-4.04) (-3.94) (-3.62) 
Other race  -0.471 -0.464 -0.465 
  (-8.88) (-8.78) (-9.13) 
Age  -0.025 -0.021 -0.020 
  (-1.90) (-1.62) (-1.51) 
Siblings  0.042 0.041 0.039 
  (9.14) (8.85) (8.43) 
Father had some high school  0.134 0.134 0.138 
  (2.64) (2.65) (2.71) 
Father finished high school plus  0.108 0.111 0.113 
  (2.37) (2.43) (2.47) 
Mother had some high school  0.345 0.339 0.346 
  (5.62) (5.55) (5.64) 
Mother finished high school plus  0.395 0.392 0.396 
  (6.44) (6.42) (6.50) 
Mother worked part-time  0.077 0.078 0.074 
  (3.37) (3.39) (3.17) 
Mother worked full-time  0.101 0.106 0.100 
  (5.14) (5.33) (4.99) 
Live alone  0.603 0.607 0.611 
  (6.65) (6.70) (6.69) 
Live with father only  0.229 0.231 0.236 
  (5.94) (5.97) (6.15) 
Live with mother only  0.186 0.186 0.187 
  (9.56) (9.58) (9.73) 
Other living arrangement  0.335 0.335 0.339 
  (9.66) (9.66) (9.73) 
City  0.373 0.371 0.373 
  (12.51) (12.52) (13.11) 
Suburb  0.468 0.466 0.481 
  (12.54) (12.67) (13.52) 








Frequent religious service attendance  -1.114 -1.117 -1.124 
  (-39.15) (-39.41) (-39.77) 
Married or engaged  -0.185 -0.185 -0.189 
  (-5.77) (-5.76) (-5.88) 
     
 
 
   80 
 
TABLE 7 (CONTINUED) 
 
 
Hours worked per week  0.010 0.010 0.011 
  (9.49) (9.78) (9.86) 
Earned income  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (6.36) (5.99) (5.98) 
Other income  0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (24.64) (24.59) (24.40) 
Cigarette tax  0.200 0.532 0.187 
  (0.38) (1.08) (0.76) 
Beer tax  -0.523 -0.281 -0.021 
  (-1.72) (-0.89) (-0.12) 
Drinking age  -0.137 -0.078  0.095 
  (-3.71) (-1.86)  (2.56) 
Marijuana price  -0.123 -0.085 -0.001 
  (-6.15) (-4.00) (-0.04) 
Marijuana potency  0.227 0.364  -0.010 
  (5.70) (6.22)  (-0.22) 
Time   -0.039  -0.307 
   (-3.08)  (-17.18) 
Time squared     0.026 
     (16.74) 
     
R-squared  0.062 0.063 0.068 
F-statistic  79.21 79.57 85.59 
Price elasticity
b  -0.335 -0.228 -0.002 
 
a All equations include state dummies. Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.  Huber 
(1967) or robust standard errors on which they are based allow for state/year clustering.  
Intercepts are not shown. 
 
b Evaluated at sample means. 
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Table 8 
SELECTED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FROM MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION 
EQUATIONS WITH HARM AND PEER MARIJUANA USE
a 
 
  Panel A:  Annual Participation (N=71,452) 
         (1)         (2)         (3) 
Marijuana  price  -0.092 -0.064 -0.053 
  (-6.80) (-4.65) (-3.37) 
Marijuana  potency  -0.134 -0.008 -0.035 
  (-6.26) (-0.26) (-1.14) 
Harm  -1.100 -1.104 -1.103 
  (-65.64) (-65.89) (-65.92) 
Peer marijuana use  4.498  4.484  4.383 
  (30.59) (30.14) (27.97) 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.188 0.188 0.188 
Price elasticity
b  -0.210 -0.146 -0.121 
Market price 








  Panel B: Thirty-Day Participation (N=71,478) 
         (1)         (2)         (3) 
Marijuana  price  -0.076 -0.011 -0.029 
  (-2.72) (-0.38) (-0.93) 
Marijuana  potency  -0.187 -0.042 -0.018 
  (-8.29) (-1.20) (-0.50) 
Harm  -1.135 -1.139 -1.140 
  (-71.19) (-71.20) (-71.24) 
Peer marijuana use  5.665  5.647  5.731 
  (34.22) (34.05) (32.40) 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.221 0.222 0.222 
Price elasticity
b  -0.102 -0.014 -0.040 
Market price 









a All equations include state dummies, real cigarette and beer taxes, minimum legal drinking age, 
and the family and individual characteristics contained in the equations in Tables 6 and 7.  
Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.  Huber (1967) or robust standard errors on which they are 
based allow for state/year clustering.   
 
b Evaluated at sample means  82 
 
TABLE  9 
 
NATIONAL VALUES OF SELECTED VARIABLES, 1982, 1992, AND 1998  
 
        
 
VARIABLE 
                 1982 
              
       1992 
       
    1998 
 
        
Annual prevalence of marijuana use    44.30  21.90  37.50 
Thirty-day prevalence of marijuana use    28.50  11.90  22.80 
Harm   2.45  2.70  2.37 
Marijuana price      1.83  6.16  5.19 
Marijuana potency   4.95  3.84  5.88 
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TABLE  10 
 
PERCENTAGE-POINT IMPACTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION 
 
Model Number
a     (1)  (2)  (3)      (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A:  Annual Participation 
1982-1992, Observed Change in Participation = -22.40 
Marijuana price   -12.74   -9.18   -0.22      -18.89  -13.04  -10.53 
Marijuana potency   -3.92    -6.73   -0.06        4.46     0.32     0.97 
Harm              -9.85   -9.87     -9.65 
Total predicted change  -16.66  -15.91     -0.28     -24.28  -22.59   -19.21 
1992-1998, Observed Change in Participation = 15.60 
Marijuana price    2.84      2.05       0.05       4.21   2.91    2.35  
Marijuana potency    7.20    12.36       0.10      -8.19  -0.59  -1.78 
Harm        13.05  13.08  12.78 
Total predicted change  10.04   14.41  0.15      9.07  15.40  13.35 
              
Panel B:  Thirty-Day Participation 
1982-1992, Observed Change in Participation = -16.60 
Marijuana price  -7.86  -5.54  -0.04    -13.56  -0.99  -7.10 
Marijuana potency  -3.44  -5.56  0.23    8.31  1.56  0.89 
Harm         -16.22  -16.23  -16.63 
Total predicted change  -11.30  -11.10  0.19    -21.47  -15.63  -22.84 
1992-1998, Observed Change in Participation = 10.90 
Marijuana price  1.75  1.24  0.01    3.02  0.22  1.58 
Marijuana potency  6.32  10.22  -0.43    -15.28  -2.86  -1.64 
Harm         21.48  21.51  22.03 
Total predicted change  8.07  11.46  -0.42    9.22  18.87  21.97 
 
a Model 1, 2, and 3 are based on the specifications in Tables 6 and 7.  These specifications exclude harm and peer marijuana use.  Model 1 
omits a trend.  Model 2 includes a linear trend.  Model 3 includes a quadratic trend.  Models 4, 5, and 6 are based on the specifications in 
Table 8 and on coefficients that take account of the effect of a given variable on peer marijuana use. Model 4 omits a trend.  Model 5 
includes a linear trend.  Model 6 includes a quadratic trend.      84 
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HallucinogensFigure 3:  Lifetime, Annual and Thirty-Day MJ Prevalence









































































































































































































































Any Illicit Drug Other
Than Marijuana
CocaineFigure 5
Annual Prevalence of Marijuana Use, Thirty-Day Prevalence of Marijuana, and the Perceived 






































Annual Preverence 30-Day Prevalence Perceived Risk of Great HarmFigure 6

































Real Retail Price Potency